DIGITAL COMPETENECES OF ACADEMIC STAFF. A NEW DIMENSION OF MEDITERRANEAN STUDIES.

New Dimensions of Mediterranean Studies:
a Multidisciplinary Approach for Experts
in Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean

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INTRODUCTION

The "Digital competences of academic staff. A new dimension of Mediterranean studies (Erasmus+ Strategic Partnerships for Higher Education (Key Action 226): Partnerships for Digital Education Readiness, Cooperation for innovation and the exchange of good practices)" project was developed by the Jagiellonian University (PL, Coordinator), University of Sevilla (ES), University of Padua (IT) and Wyższa Szkoła Turystyki i Ekologii w Suchej Beskidzkiej (PL) to improve the skills of team members in digital teaching and to develop, exchange, and produce innovative educational programs and materials for the education and training of experts on security and cooperation in the Mediterranean. The main assumptions of the project can be summarized as follows: a) the use of expertise of the team members from the universities of Sevilla and Padua in the areas of geography, tourism studies, history, and politics of the Mediterranean in order to create an experimental course on security and cooperation in the Mediterranean at the Jagiellonian University (and, in the long run, also a special study program concerning the Mediterranean region); (b) the widening and fostering of teaching activities in all partner universities; c) joint participation in training for digital teaching. All teams would benefit from this interdisciplinary exchange with experts representing other disciplines relevant to Mediterranean studies and from the development of expertise in the use of digital instruments and technologies applied to socio-political studies.

After two and a half years of development, the project has been successfully implemented. At the Jagellonian University, the experimental course has been offered "*Dilemmas of multiculturalism and pluralism in the Mediterranean*" at the Institute of European Studies. Moreover, the knowledge and skills gained through the project allowed us to improve and expand the teaching offer on the Mediterranean already existing at the Faculty of International and Political Studies, namely at the Institute of European Studies (courses provided by the members of the Department of Politics and Culture of the Mediterranean Countries) and in the Institute of Intercultural Studies (courses: "Multiculturalism of Italy"; "Cultural Diversity of the Iberian Peninsula"). At the University of Padua, teaching on Mediterranean issues have been expanded, with new courses now taught in the MA in International Relations and Diplomacy and the MA on Human Rights and Multilevel Governance, namely "International History of the Balkans" and "International History

of the Middle East", and specific teaching units dealing with Mediterranean issues have been included in other courses of the same programs: "International relations after 1990", "EU Law – advanced" and "Human rights in International Politics". At the University of Seville, the insights acquired in Task 06, combined with digital skills from previous tasks, have upgraded most of the related courses across different official degree study plans. Particularly, in the Degree of Geography and Territory Management, this applies to courses such as "Geography of Europe" (first year) and "Geography of Andalusia" (third year), which are both mandatory for students, as well as "Regional Development and Tourism in Andalusia" in the fourth year as an elective. In the degree in Tourism, courses like "Territory, Tourism, and Sustainable Development" and "Geographical Analysis of Tourism in Andalusia," mandatory in the second and third years respectively, are included. Also, within the MA in Territory Management, Instruments, and Intervention Techniques, the subject "Development Cooperation: Financing, Actors, and Internationalization" is mandatory within the specialization in Territorial Development Management. Likewise, the development of a proposal will also be considered, to be presented to the Permanent Training Center (CFP) of the University of Seville, for a non-regulated Expert Course. This course, worth 15 ECTS credits, will be offered as a distance learning (online) option, coordinated with the universities in Krakow and Padua, and taught in both English and Spanish, with a theme related to the Mediterranean Studies explored in this Erasmus+ project.

This e-textbook for students is a major result of the project and of the cooperation among the four teams. It brings together twelve scholarly studies dealing with political, social, cultural, economic, legal, and humanitarian issues that shape and embed cooperation and security relations, and nurture interdependencies in the Mediterranean area, conceptualized here as both a geopolitical region and as a socio-cultural area. Each study associated with a particular course taught in the partner universities and is conceived as a teaching tool for online teaching, in which students are expected to carry out a significant part of the work independently, with the meetings with the teacher having a tutorial and support function. As a result, the textbook offers students a set of synthetic texts containing the essential aspects of the chosen topic, bibliographic references to broaden the knowledge of students on the issue, a wider bibliography for further study and research, sections dedicated to textual and audio/video materials available online, as well as self-evaluation questions to support

students in preparing for the final assessment. In Western European universities, Mediterranean studies are common but the ambition of the book is to reach out to the broader community of scholars through its genuinely innovative multidisciplinary approach. This e-textbook is designed in particular for students and scholars from Central and Eastern Europe, where Mediterranean studies are currently experiencing a surge in interest in university curricula. Despite the attention being drawn to a certain extent to the Eastern European perspective, the southern border of Europe remains an area marked by complex interactions and intense human flows which are of great geopolitical relevance in the pursuit of security and cooperation.

During the development of the project, the collaboration between the four teams generated a positive dynamic from the point of view of the scientific contents which were pooled together. In particular during team meetings and disseminating events (conferences, workshops), the exchange of scientific points of view and teaching materials confirmed the value and challenges of a broader interdisciplinary approach to the study of the area. The encounters of scholars of history, international and European law, tourism, cultural studies, geography, environmental issues, post-colonial studies and political scientists was particularly fruitful, so much so the idea was put forward to imagine a publication open to contributions from scholars outside the project team and with further scientific expertise. One result of this collective work is the editorial project Routledge *Handbook on Cooperation, Interdependencies and Security in the Mediterranean*. The book will be coordinated by editors from the Jagiellonian University (Karolina Golemo), the University of Padua (Elena Calandri) and the University of Sevilla (Jesús Ventura Fernández), and will include 25 chapters authored by members of the DG_MED project plus highly qualified scholars from different disciplines. Its aim is to provide a truly innovative and highly qualified approach to the study of the area. The first part of the Handbook will provide the historical and theoretical backgrounds for understanding cooperation and security dynamics in the region. The second part will focus on thematic questions related to migration, cultural dialogue and education, human rights, infrastructure, and international law. The chapters of this student e-textbook have been conceived as an abbreviated version of the full chapters of the abovementioned Handbook, one which the promoters expect to become a relevant scientific contribution to the field.

EU-MEDITERRANEAN RELATIONS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 1945-2000

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Introduction

Relations between the EEC, later the EU, and Mediterranean countries bear the legacy of a century-long interaction between people, empires, and states, determined by their geographical proximity and shaped by different phases in international history and changing political, economic, and cultural waves. At the end of the WWII, relations were structured around Europe's post-imperial hegemony in North Africa and the Middle East, its decline following two decades of devastating European cultural, political and military infighting, and the inception of global bipolarism. In the forty-five years of the Cold War and thirty years of post-bipolar transition, Euro-Mediterranean relations have gone through different phases. Post-colonial bonds remained strong, yet they changed under the influence of new local dynamics and global phenomena, geopolitical rivalries and economic, human or technological trends. The number and diversity of actors and layers of interaction in the area create a complex setting, which do not allow simplifications and single-issue explanations.

A proper history of EU-Mediterranean interactions can only be written using documentary sources from the EU institutions and member states archives, which are now accessible up until the mid to late 1990s, complemented by oral history sources. In the political literature in particular, it is commonplace to regard pre-Maastricht EC foreign policy as a fiction or a mere

aspiration, and only to consider initiatives taken under the CFSP as proper foreign policy. Historical research, however, tells a different story, showing that ever since the beginning of European integration, Mediterranean issues have been on the agenda, and that more recent trends can only be understood by adopting a longer perspective, including the entire history of attempts to structure the relationship between an integrating Europe and its southern neighborhood.

In European studies, periodizations are often based on the EC/EU political-institutional developments. Our periodization combines political-institutional developments with sociocultural visions, with a special focus on the role of states, institutions, and socio-cultural perspectives.

Post-colonial adjustment 1945-1968

Countries in the Mediterranean subject to European rule attained independence in 1946 (Lebanon and Syria) 1951 (Libya) 1955-56 (Morocco, Tunisia, Cyprus) Algeria (1962) Malta (1964) while the basin became "an American lake", owing to the US strategic build-up driven by the Cold War. American soft power was only beginning to impact the region, however, and the US welcomed the European economic commitment to financing regional development, as far as it did not infringe upon the liberalization of international trade embodied in the GATT. Existing preferential commercial bonds between the EEC countries and the Mediterranean countries – including the North African and Eastern Mediterranean countries as well as southern European non-member countries like Spain, Yugoslavia, Turkey etc. – remained important. North African and Middle Eastern agricultural producers (cotton, wine, citrus fruits, olive oil, dried fruits) struggled to retain their place in the EEC protected agricultural market. Meanwhile, oil and gas supplies acquired a strategic relevance but were not included in any European common approach. Northbound migration flows toward Europe began, while the communities of European "*colons*" left the former colonial possessions. Furthermore, Jewish people moved away from Arab countries as the conflict over Palestine became increasingly embittered. As a result, the ethnic and cultural diversity which had characterized the Mediterranean ports and countries in the ancient and modern ages disappeared. In many fields, be it migrations, energy supplies, cultural exchanges and of course

security, the EEC as such lacked the requisite instruments to act. Nor did members states find a political agreement for a common approach to the area, as postcolonial bonds remained strong. Bilateralism and national actorship were therefore prominent.

The development-security nexus 1967-1979

The global change in North-South relations, the growth of the development issue as a major issue in international politics, and the request for a New International Economic Order on one hand, and institutional development in the EC, including enlargement to the UK, the centralization of external trade policy and the search for a coordination in member states' foreign policy on the other, created political and institutional conditions for a new phase. The EEC took a regional approach, based on development cooperation and upgraded economic integration, in a bid to lead a renewal in north-south relations and to enlarge its markets. Both were strongly unpopular with the Nixon administration, which took unilateral measures to protect US economic interests. Development was not the only driver, however, as after the 1967 Six Day War until the Camp David Agreements, the Mediterranean was a theatre for the global Cold War, intertwined with local conflicts such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, and those between the new oil economies. Some European countries became more aware of their dependence on Arab energy supplies than others, and were more forthcoming toward Palestinians' requests for political recognition. Following the effects of the 1973 oil shock, answers from Mediterranean Countries to EC policy (i.e. the so-called Global Mediterranean Policy) and negotiation tables (i.e. the Euro-Arab Dialogue) were mitigated, partly because the United States grew increasingly and overtly hostile to EEC initiatives in the area and many Arab countries were keen to retain their freedom of action. This was also a consequence of the changing balance in the Arab world, leadership of which passed from Egypt to Algeria to the Gulf. The financial power of the oil producing countries created new dynamics in the area, including new migration flows. The bloody Israeli-Palestinian conflict affected Euro-Arab cooperation, despite mutual interest in stronger cooperation.

The watershed of the 1980s

During the 1980s, many factors coincided to stall North-South integration and cooperation in the area, prompting instead estrangement and divarication. Among them, it is especially useful to focus on three areas: 1) The EC Mediterranean enlargement and the European Single Market 2) Demography, migrations, and the creation of the European Schengen regime 3) The LDC debt crisis and the fall of commodity prices. Increased economic and cultural divergence and a less and less permeable border separated the Northern and Southern shores, as trade, human and financial and monetary bonds in Europe became tighter following the Single European Act and the choice of monetary unification. Southern and eastern Mediterranean countries were slow to react to "globalization" and the Mediterranean became the focus for a cultural resistance to it. Development remained the official rationale for EU policy toward the area, but its meaning in the language of the EC changed, as it included security issues such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, illegal migrations, Islamic anti-Western militancy. US policy during the Reagan administration chose a confrontational attitude toward local regimes supporting the Palestinian cause through terrorism, and emphasized a pro-Israeli stand which made Europe's position in the conflict all the more irrelevant and uncomfortable.

The Mediterranean as test case for the EU as "global actor"

A new phase in Euro-Mediterranean relations was ignited by changes in the Middle East and the Mediterranean following the 1990-91 Gulf Crisis and the instauration of the US permanent military presence in the area, and by the establishment of the European Foreign and Security Policy (ECSP) and the ensuing search for visible and bold common initiatives to fulfil the EU's new international role. The low key EC approach to the area confirmed in the 1990 Renewed Mediterranean Policy (RMP) was upgraded at the November 1995 Barcelona Conference into the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Undersigned by the fifteen EU members states and twelve Mediterranean countries, the Barcelona Declaration was mainly drafted by one EU member country, France. It emphasized economic-commercial integration, promoting a free trade area by 2010, and unenthusiastically included political, security, and cultural/human dimensions. The EMP implementation was soon stalled due to the break down in the Middle East Peace Process and its intrinsic weaknesses

and ambiguity, and to increased political divergence for the two shores, magnified by the EU insistence on human rights and good governance, which became a key legitimizing feature of its "global" profile during the 1990s. In fact, while the Mediterranean was targeted as a neighboring area, it also became a major test case for EU attempts to become a "global actor", which was particularly emboldened by the Eastern Enlargement and the launch of the Euro. Despite a seemingly regional approach and financial support for regional integration (in particular in the MENA 2 program), bilateral relations, by way of association agreements and country specific programs, continued to prevail, something which was later consolidated in the 2004 European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and in the 2008 Union pour la Méditerranée.

From the point of view of Europe, EC/EU-Mediterranean relations have developed within three major constraints: the glass ceiling of the hegemonic role of the US, the tension between the build-up of EC/EU political/institutional capabilities vis-à-vis resilient national member states, and the volatility and fragmentation of the area. From the point of view of the "Mediterranean" countries, the search for an independent political, economic, and social state-building primed interactions with Europe, although economic bonds were crucial, and people's mobility gradually grew into a key argument. Bilateralism and conflict play a major role as causes of the fragmentation, with oil/gas resources as a key determinant of economic change.

Questions for students:

1. Discuss the trends in economic relations in the Mediterranean, explaining how European economic integration has affected – positively or negatively – economic relations in the Mediterranean.
2. Trace and explain the impact of US policy on EC/EU Mediterranean relations during the Cold War.
3. Explain the issues of bilateralism and multilateralism in the Mediterranean.

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Useful links:

- European Union Historical Archives, San Domenico di Fiesole,

https://www.eui.eu/en/academic-units/historical-archives-of-the-european-union

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THE EU AND THE WESTERN BALKANS:
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

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Introduction

When considering the "Western Balkans" today, we refer to a great extent to a geographical region which, between 1945 and 1991, was part of the socialist federal republic of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was established as a socialist federal republic in 1945, after the end of the Second World War and its leader was Josip Broz "Tito". Yugoslavia encompassed six republics – namely Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia – and two autonomous provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo. Tito's motto was "brotherhood and unity". The socialist ideology was supposed to be the unifying factor for such a complex federation. After 1945, Yugoslavia was a close ally of the Soviet Union. However, Tito did not acknowledge Stalin's willingness to be the undisputed leader of all the Soviet bloc countries and, in June 1948, Yugoslavia was expelled from the Soviet bloc. Initially, it was the United States and the United Kingdom which decided to "keep Tito afloat" through financial and military means, in order to safeguard Yugoslavia's independence.[1] Gradually, however, it was the European Economic Community (EEC) which was to become Yugoslavia's major economic and political partner. How and why did this happen?

When the EEC was established in 1957, the Soviet Union and its satellites launched a policy of non-recognition which lasted until the very end of the Cold War. This was not the case

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[1] Lorraine M. Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia and the Cold War* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1997).

for Yugoslavia which, by virtue of its independent policy, decided to adopt a "realistic" attitude towards the EEC. It understood that it was important for it to establish commercial relations with its Western European partners. Ideological questions had to be left apart. In the late 1960s, Yugoslav diplomacy made its first requests to conclude a trade agreement with the EEC. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and the fear that Yugoslavia might be the next target, spurred EEC member states to welcome Yugoslavia's requests in order to demonstrate their support for its stability and independence. The first commercial agreement between the EEC and Yugoslavia was concluded, after some months of negotiations, in March 1970.

The political dimension of the 1970 agreement was confirmed during the 1970s, when the case of Yugoslavia became part of a broader scenario of instability which affected Southern Europe.[2] In Yugoslavia, a confederal constitution was approved in 1974, attributing large competences to the republican centers. Yugoslavia's Western partners regarded this internal reform with great wariness, as they understood that this was a sign of Yugoslavia's internal weakness. Also, this reform was accompanied by an additional question: what would happen in Yugoslavia after Tito? Would the Soviet Union exploit instability in Yugoslavia to bring it back into the Soviet fold? The solution adopted by its main Western European partners was to keep this country as it was, with the West, but not in the West, in order not to alter the country's internal and international balance. The formal document which sanctioned and sanctified this policy was a Joint Declaration that the two parties signed in December 1976.[3]

However, the following decade was marked by the deterioration of the economic and political situation in Yugoslavia. This led to the rise of ethno-nationalist dynamics at the republican level and the gradual rediscovery of past national memories. [4] This became particularly evident in the late 1980s, when it was faced with the fall of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. The ideological crisis of communism also meant a crisis of legitimacy for Yugoslavia's ruling party. This affected the legitimacy of the whole federation and its federal government. After November 1989 – the month when the Berlin Wall fell – Yugoslavia made

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[2] Benedetto Zaccaria, "Assessing Yugoslavia's Place in Western European Stabilisation Policies in Southern Europe, 1974-1976", *Journal of European Integration History* 22, no. 1, 2016, pp. 67-83.
[3] Benedetto Zaccaria, *The EEC's Yugoslav Policy in Cold War Europe, 1968-1989* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
[4] Dejan Jović, *Yugoslavia. A State that Withered Away* (West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 2009).

a last, desperate effort to become more integrated within the EEC. The Yugoslav leader who started the rapprochement with the EEC was Prime Minister Ante Marković. He made explicit declarations about the need for Yugoslavia to avoid missing the train of European integration. However, his reformist strategy clashed with the emergence of nationalist leaderships in all republics. The breaking point was June 1991, when Slovenia and Croatia issued their declarations of independence. This led to the outbreak of the first military escalation in the Yugoslav scenario, which took place in Slovenia. The Yugoslav crisis was a "foreign policy" test for the EEC member states, which were then negotiating their future "Common Foreign and Security Policy". However, they proved to be unable to mediate the conflict, which from April 1992 also involved Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was the United States, and NATO in particular, which resolved the war in mid-1995 through a military intervention against the Bosnian Serbs. All in all, the European Union (EU) – formally established in by the Maastricht Treaty of February 1992 – was unable to mediate the escalation of a war in its backyard.[5] Also, it failed to secure its traditional goal in the Western Balkan region, namely stability.

The end of the wars in Bosnia Herzegovina – sanctioned by the Dayton Agreement of November 1995, was a new beginning for the EU. Starting from 1996, the EU was deeply involved in the reconstruction of this country, which needed basic infrastructures and financial means to recover after years of war.[6] From a political viewpoint, the EU wanted to recover its image after the diplomatic failure of the early 1990s. In other words, the EU acted in need of political catharsis. This idea underpins the financial effort carried out by the EU in the region after 1996. Also, the EU gradually shaped a "regional approach" which should re-create regional economic networks. As noted by the European Commission in this regard: "Regardless of the far-reaching political divisions of the past, there can be no long-term political stability in the region without a rapid return to a significant degree of cooperation between each of the countries and its neighbours"[7].

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[5] Sonia Lucarelli, *Europe and the Breakup of Yugoslavia. A Political Failure in Search of Scholarly Explanation* (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000).

[6] Ivan Obadić and Benedetto Zaccaria, "The European Commission and the Yugoslav Crises", in Vincent Dujardin et al. (eds.), *The European Commission 1986-2000*: *History and Memories of an Institution* (Luxembourg: Publication office of the EU), pp. 606-613.

[7] Commission of the European Communities, Report from the Commission to the Council, Prospects for the development of regional cooperation for the countries of the former Yugoslavia and what the Community could do to foster such cooperation, Brussels, 14.02.1994, SEC(96)252 final (http://aei.pitt.edu/3975/1/3975.pdf)

This "regional" shift accelerated after the war in Kosovo. This was a former autonomous province of Yugoslavia which claimed independence from Serbia. Starting from late 1998, the situation escalated with an open confrontation between the Serb army and the Kosovo Liberation Army. After a new failure of international mediation, the crisis was resolved – once again – through the intervention of NATO. The war in Kosovo, which lasted between March and June 1999, revealed once again the need for a stabilization strategy in the Balkans. This was the time when the term "Western Balkans" entered EU political jargon. The idea was that of pursuing an ambitious regional agenda which should not concern individual countries, but the region as a whole. The turning point in this regard was May 1999, when the European Commission launched the Stabilization and Association Process, which framed the financial and commercial means for the Western Balkans countries to associate with the EU for the first time.[8]

Gradually, the idea was established that the EU should be the "external" master of the region, driving the countries of the post-Yugoslav space plus Albania towards a process of Europeanization. The long-term goal was that of EU membership. This became particularly clear in a series of declarations which were issued by the European Council at Santa Maria da Feira (June 2000)[9] and Copenhagen (December 2002).[10] In between, the EU role in the region was underlined during a summit held in Zagreb between the EU and its Western Balkan partners in November 2000.[11] The final step in this process was the EU-Western Balkans summit held in Thessaloniki in June 2003. During this summit, the EU member states approved the "Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans – Moving towards European integration", which for the first time declared that "the future of the Western Balkans is into the European Union".[12] This statement reflected the optimism which characterized European integration in the early 2000s. This was the period when EU member states were negotiating the Treaty adopting a constitution for Europe (which would be rejected by French and Dutch voters in 2005). Also, the Thessaloniki declaration was issued on the eve of the so-called "Big Bang"

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[8] Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the Stabilization and Association process for countries of South-Eastern Europe (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania), Brussels, 26.05.1999, COM(1999)235 final (http://aei.pitt.edu/3571/1/3571.pdf).

[9] http://aei.pitt.edu/43325/1/Feira_Council.pdf

[10] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20906/73842.pdf

[11] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/declang4.doc.html

[12] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/misc/76291.pdf

enlargement of 2004, when 10 countries joined the EU. In sum, the Thessaloniki declaration must be read within this euro-enthusiastic framework.

What followed after the Thessaloniki declaration of 2003 was a period of high expectations and great disillusion.[13] None of the Western Balkan countries mentioned in the Thessaloniki declaration – with the exception of Croatia – has become a member of the EU, despite several declarations and regional summits which have kept the enlargement perspective open. What are the reasons which have conditioned the EU enlargement towards the Western Balkans? Several reasons pertain to the domestic sphere: from the unstable situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina – which is still deeply divided according to the ethno-national lines sanctified by the Dayton Peace Agreement (1995) to the permanent tension of relations between Serbia and Kosovo, despite the mediation mechanism enacted by the European Union.[14] Scholars have also identified "stabilitocracy" – namely the EU's tendency to privilege "stability" over "democratization" – as one of the factors hampering political evolution in the Western Balkans. [15] Yet international factors have also contributed to this impasse, including: 1) the failure of the constitutional treaty in 2005, which inaugurated a period of marked euro-skepticism and obliged EU policymakers to shift their agenda from external to internal questions; 2) The financial crisis of 2007/08 which sidelined the enlargement agenda and, more in general, confirmed the centrality of financial and monetary affairs to the detriment of EU's external relations; 3) The ensuing rise of populist parties in the 2010s, which challenged the EU's enlargement agenda; 4) The crisis in Ukraine shifted the focus of the EU from the Western Balkans toward the post-Soviet space. Also, it complicated the enlargement agenda, faced with the requests stemming from Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. Will they favor or disadvantaged the Western Balkans, which have been in the waiting room of the EU since 2003? Furthermore, most Western Balkans countries, with the exception of Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, have closely sided with the EU foreign policy towards the sanctions imposed on Russia, despite the adverse commercial consequences that this choice might imply.[16] Theirs is a clear political decision in view of the future entry into the European Union. But this decision

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[13] Roberto Belloni, *The rise and fall of peacebuilding in the Balkans* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020).
[14] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/belgrade-pristina-
dialogue_en#:~:text=The%20EU%2Dfacilitated%20Dialogue%20aims,the%20lives%20of%20their%20citizens.
[15] Belloni, *The rise and fall of peacebuilding*, cit.
[16] On Serbia's stance, see Florian Bieber, "Why Serbia's President Is a Threat to Europe", *Foreign Policy, 2022* (https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/05/serbia-vucic-mladic-mural-lithium-china-russia-threat-europe/).

is instrumental to future gains: a sort of *do ut des*. Will the EU be ready to make these countries win back their stake? Between the launch of the "Enlargement Package"[17] (12 October 2022), the EU-Western Balkans summit held in Tirana (December 2022), and the Keynote Speech by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen at the Globesec 2023 in Bratislava (31 May 2023),[18] several declarations by EU representatives seemed to herald a new shift in momentum in the EU's policy towards the Western Balkans.[19] Thus far, however, no concrete steps have been adopted which might pave the way towards EU enlargement towards the region: political conditions, both internal and external, are still missing.

Questions for students:

1. What are the long-term priorities of the EEC/EU policies towards Yugoslavia and, later, the Western Balkans?
2. What are the major historical turning points of the relationship between the EEC and Yugoslavia?
3. Why did the EU develop a regional framework in the Western Balkans in the late 1990s?
4. What are the external factors hampering the current EU policy towards the Western Balkans?

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TURKEY AS A RISING POWER IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

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Introduction

The Mediterranean has long been seen as an area of interest for Turkey. Fernand Braudel already noted, in his monograph The Mediterranean Sea in the Times of Philip II, that this region was at that time under the strong influence of the Ottoman Empire, which then controlled over 50% of the coasts of this sea. In Turkish historical memory, at different times, the Mediterranean region was perceived as a vector of glory and success or, on the contrary, failure and decline. After 1923, during the Kemalist era, there were visible efforts aimed at the Europeanization of Turkey, focusing on continental politics, but remaining distrustful of the Arab states that emerged from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. Gradually, however, Turkey "returned" to the Mediterranean policy. Since the beginning of the 1960s, when the dispute over the future of Cyprus intensified, Turkey started a new policy in the Levant region. Ultimately, however, the coming to power of the Justice and Development Party in 2002, the beginnings of activism in Ankara's foreign policy, and the fact that the new foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu (Davutoğlu 2001), made it necessary to use the strategic assets of its history and geographical location to regain its position as a central power on the international chessboard, meant that the Mediterranean Sea was treated by Ankara as a place of opportunities for the implementation of many initiatives. The term "Eastern Mediterranean" has only appeared in political journalism in the last decade. This was also influenced by the discovery of natural gas deposits in 2009-2015 in the sea between Israel, Egypt, and Cyprus. Turkey also increased its interest in the Mediterranean after Russia's

intervention in Syria in 2015, claiming a coastal shelf stretching south and west, while refusing to grant any significant EEZ to Cyprus and the Greek islands. The issue of Turkey's foreign policy seems to be a very important and current topic. The volatility of decisions and behaviors has been particularly visible recently in the context of the ongoing war, relations between Ankara and the Kremlin, and the importance of energy policy for the European Union.

The worsening relationship between the EU and Turkey is due, among other things, to the country's role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the conflict between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus over the natural gas deposits of the Eastern Mediterranean, Ankara's activities in Libya, disagreements over the search of cargo ships sailing under the Turkish flag, and the Hagia Sophia. The latter can be traced back to the conversion of Sophia into a mosque. Changes in Turkey's foreign policy have been visible since the beginning of the 20th century, even at the level of declarations. The role of a passive "bridge" between East and West was rejected – and the Davutoğlu doctrine, defined as "strategic depth", emphasized Turkey's central place in the region, both culturally and geographically, i.e. as the "central state" (merkez devlet) (Davutoğlu 2001). In addition, Davutoğlu promoted Turkey to the role of 'order-setting state' (düzen kurucu devlet) Gradually, the AKP adopted its own stance on several distinctly Islamist issues, from arguing with Israel over its Gaza offensive in December 2008 and January 2009 to its approach to Arab uprisings of 2011, strengthening links with the Muslim Brotherhood. Turkey sought even greater independence in pursuing its foreign policy goals, defined as "strategic autonomy" (Dalacoura 2017). As Ankara seeks to assert itself in the region, these aspirations reflect the importance of Turkey's energy exploration. It should not be forgotten that Turkey's prospects for EU accession have basically disappeared, leaving the country with less incentive to refrain from engaging in conflict with EU member states in the region, such as Cyprus or Greece. Currently, the Eastern Mediterranean region does not supply Turkey with gas, except for occasional spot transactions with Egypt.

Erdoğan's and his party's goal is not to literally rebuild the Ottoman Empire as a single state entity stretching from Algeria to the Persian Gulf, and from the Dnieper to the Hijaz. Rather, it is about making Turkey a regional power unparalleled in the Middle East, building a sphere of influence among former provinces where the will of the Turkish president will prevail over that of local leaders, and making Istanbul the center of the Sunni world, as it was in the time of the sultans. The concept of neo-Ottomanism assumes not so much military conquest

of dependent territories as controlling them through Turkish influence, money, and soft power (Öniş 2012).

The Eastern Mediterranean:

The gas field explorations in the 2010s have increased the value of territorial waters and the location of Exclusive Economic Zones for the participating coastal states. Based on the UNCLOS, many states managed to reach an agreement, however, Turkey, which has not signed the international treaty, claims a much larger area for itself, partly with Cyprus (where it also represents the interests of the Turkish entity in the northern part of the island) and partly with Greece (Köchler 2020). It achieved this through the government communication of the Mavi Vatan (Blue Home) doctrine, and partly through the agreements signed with the Libyan Unity Government (GNA) in Tripoli in 2019 - the latter were partly about a joint Libyan-Turkish maritime border and partly about Ankara's military assistance. Thanks to the latter, in the first half of 2020, it was possible to secure the GNA against the forces arrayed against it.

Another pivotal point of the dispute in the Mediterranean region is the Turkish-Cypriot conflict, which bleeds from several wounds, and related to this, the different interpretations of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The exclusive economic zone is an area extending to a maximum of 200 nautical miles, in which only the coastal state has the right to extract the resources and raw materials found there. According to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the exclusive economic zone is also established around the islands. However, the problem is that Turkey has not ratified this convention, so according to its opinion, the border of the EEZ should be calculated from the mainland, not from the islands (Stocker 2012).

On September 25, 2020, the leaders of the 27 European Union countries planned to meet at the European Council meeting in Brussels to vote on imposing sanctions on Turkey. The point of contention was what the EU considered Ankara's illegal actions against Greece and Cyprus, which are members of the EU. Relations between the EU and Turkey were frozen after 2018, when Ankara launched its aggressive diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean. At that time,

the Council voted in favor of freezing Turkey's EU accession negotiations and suspended work on modernizing the union between the community and its eastern neighbor. A vote against Turkey next week could make the alienation permanent. Controversial concepts have emerged within the EU. For example, France advocated punishing Turkey, while Italy supported the idea of further talks with Ankara. Thus, the division into blocks is outlined. Greece, Cyprus, and France favor strong action against Turkey, while Italy, Malta and Spain oppose more serious sanctions. However, Germany, Italy and Malta remain skeptical about imposing sanctions on Turkey. The authorities of these countries expect that in response to such a step, the government in Ankara may open the border to Europe for 4 million migrants who are currently residing in Turkey. This is an argument often used by opponents of the EU taking decisive action against Ankara. EU diplomacy is also concerned about such a scenario (Burchard 2010).

Thus, the game to establish Pax Mediterranea is to win over Italy to this idea and create a concert of four powers (Egypt, Turkey, France, and Italy). Cooperation may run into problems because France and Italy have different approaches to regional affairs in the Mediterranean. France is secretly collaborating with Egypt by arming that country. France has also backed forces in eastern Libya against the pro-Western GNA (Yüksel 2021), and this government is supported militarily by Turkey and Italy, a sign so far of an Italo-Turkish deal reinforced by the two countries' trade ties. However, Italy does not fulfill the role of a bridge between Europe and the Middle East, to the extent that the geographical location of the country would indicate (Carbone 2008: 111-113). However, the opportunity to build an independent foreign policy within the framework of international powers ran into several problems, such as political instability at home (seven different governments in the last ten years), diplomatic mismanagement, and a fairly clear misunderstanding of the current dynamics in the Levantine Mediterranean.

Questions for students

1. How are Turkey's conflicts with its eastern Mediterranean neighbors affecting Ankara's European aspirations?

2. How can the processes of the Europeanisation of Turkish foreign policy be described?

3. What was the role of the revolutionary processes referred to as the Arab Spring in turning Turkish foreign policy away from isolationism?

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EUROAFRICA: THE CULTURAL HISTORY OF AN IDEA

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Eurafrica is a geopolitical narrative developed in the interwar period by three thinkers of international politics, namely: *Richard Coudenhove Kalergi* - an Austrian diplomat, spokesperson for the pan-European movement and author of the seminal "PanEurope" published 1923, Eugène Guernier, a French political scientist, known of his L'Afrique champ d'expansion de l'Europe, published in 1932, and last but not least, Paolo d'Agostino Orsini di Camerota, an Italian Africanist and geographer, an author of the monograph under the title: Eurafrica. L'Europa per l'Africa, l'Africa per l'Europa, published in 1934.

Euroafrica was conceptualized by these thinkers in terms of a geopolitical project that was meant to be founded on the idea of complementarity or a sort of interdependence between Europe and Africa. Generally, Eugène Guernier's and d'Agostino Orsini di Camerota's perspective was framed in the context of colonial policy, a kind of an ideology justifying the interests of the French colonial power and the imperial policy of fascism (Gozzi 2021). Guernier's concept was based on the vision of Africa as a new living space, a land rich in mineral resources which Europe needed for its geo-economic and geopolitical expansion.

In the case of d'Agostino Orsini di Camerota, the idea of Eurafrica came into being in the 1930s. It coined as an economic and demographic concept to justify the policy of demographic colonialism in Africa. Later on, in the early 1940s, it evolved towards a political project.

Assuming that neither Europe nor Africa were economically self-sufficient, but rather closely interdependent, the Italian researcher argued that Eurafrica could be a third autarkic space, after America and Asia. It should be supervised by an axis of European states led by Italy, which, due to its colonial gains in Ethiopia in the 1930s, as well as historical traditions related

to the presence of ancient Rome in North Africa, would play a decisive role. According to this concept, the Mediterranean Sea was not a border, but an element connecting the two continents.

After the Second World War, the original project of Eurafrica understood as "Africa for Europeans" (d'Agostino Orsini di Camerota 1934) underwent a major shift in its character and was set up in a new context related to the dynamics of the Cold War and post-colonialism. The Euro-African alliance was to become an important factor of an equilibrium within international system, in particular as it was meant to be a response to the policy of the USSR and the United States in the Mediterranean basin, and a counterbalance to the Eurasia project. Both in the concept of Guernier and D'Agostino Orsini di Camerota, Europe linked with Africa was expected to become a balancing force between two superpowers, as well as an alternative to the emerging self-determination movements in North Africa.

In the 1950s, along with the ongoing European integration processes, the Eurafrica project became ever more relevant issue in light of the transformation of relationship between European colonies in Africa and the nascent European Community. In particular, the project was intended to guarantee France's privileged position in the African continent and allow it to maintain its status as a great power in the international arena. The need to maintain special relations between Europe and Africa found its expression in the Treaties of Rome. In articles 182 - 188 (former articles 131 - 136) IV part entitled Association of Overseas Countries and Territories of the Treaties establishing the European Community, a reference was made to the promotion of the economic, social and cultural development of the Overseas Countries and Territories and the establishment of close economic relations between them and the Community as a whole. This concept was strongly supported by Robert Schuman himself, who in an article entitled Unité européenne et Eurafrique, in 1957, emphasised that the establishment of Eurafrica was "a revolutionary political act built on economic foundations". The collapse of the colonial system in the 1950s and 1960s and the ongoing integration processes led to a re-evaluation of the European Community's Mediterranean policy. Gradually, the concept of Eurafrica evolved from a post-colonial perspective to a Euro-African policy. According to this new perspective, Europe should be integrated not only internally, but also it should strive for close integration with Africa, which was expected to advance Europe as the third superpower alongside the USA and the USSR.

The first attempts to approach the Mediterranean region in terms of as a single geopolitical and geo-economic region were made in 1972, when the Global Mediterranean Policy was launched during the Paris Summit in October 1972. On July 31, 1974, at a meeting of the Arab League representation with the President of the European Commission and the Council, the Euro-Arab Dialogue had been called into being.

However, the Cold War rivalry projected onto the Mediterranean area blocked the mechanisms of interregional cooperation significantly. As correctly observed by Guido de Marco, Malta's Foreign Minister, "the Mediterranean region emerged after the Cold War as an area totally unprepared to deal with regional conflicts, neither in terms of generally accepted practice nor in an institutional sense.".

Hence, it became necessary to develop new mechanisms of cooperation between the Mediterranean countries of the European Community (France, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and the Arab Maghreb Union's countries (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia). One of the first initiatives in this direction was the establishment of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean Basin and the establishment of the 5+5 Group in September 1990.

A real breakthrough in Euro-Mediterranean relations was the adoption of the Barcelona Declaration on 28 November 1995. It marked the new chapter in cooperation between the European Union and non-Mediterranean countries within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (also known as the Barcelona Process). The Barcelona Declaration assumed three levels of cooperation: 1) political dialogue and security; 2) economic and financial cooperation; 3) cultural dialogue as well as social and humanitarian assistance.

Another attempt to institutionalize cooperation in the Mediterranean was the Union for the Mediterranean, presented by French President Nicolas Sarkozy in Toulon on February 7, 2007. Sarkozy's idee fixe was that the Union was to be a complementary structure to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, whose role was basically to support the existing forms of political and economic cooperation between the rich countries of the North and the poor South (Wojaczek 2013). Sarkozy firmly advocated strengthening cooperation between the European Union and the Arab countries of the Mediterranean. He intended to make France and Algeria, a former French colony, the main axis of the region. Initially, Sarkozy's idea

met with skepticism from Germany, as well as a complete lack of approval from the Libyan president, Col. Muammar al-Gaddafi. In its ultimate form, the new initiative was designed not only for the Mediterranean countries, but also for all participants from the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. It was further extended into Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Mauritania, Monaco, and Libya. The Union for the Mediterranean was formally established in Paris on July 13, 2008, during the bilateral summit of the European Council and North Africa and the Middle East leaders. Its main objectives included: 1) enhancing the peace process negotiations in the Middle East, 2) boosting cultural and educational exchange between interested parties of the region; 3) establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area; 4) setting up legal regulations regarding immigration policy in the Mediterranean area.

Unlike the Barcelona Process, the Mediterranean Union was expected to build bridges linking North Africa and the African Union with the European Union. It was designed to implement projects such as: 1) preventing further contamination of the Mediterranean Sea; 2) improving infrastructure of the transport connection system; 3) advancing solar energy system; 4) improving natural and manmade disaster prevention system; 5) developing joint higher education and research programs.

 Questions for students:

1) Discuss the evolution of the idea of Eurafrica as envisaged in Guernier's and D'Agostino Orsini di Camerota's concepts in the 1930s as well as in the post-colonial perspective.

2) How was the concept of Euro-African cooperation accommodated in the Treaties of Rome?

3) What were the goals of the Barcelona Process and the Union for the Mediterranean?

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POSTCOLONIAL NARRATIVES IN CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE. THE EXAMPLE OF THE DJASS – AFRODESCENDANTS ASSOCIATION IN PORTUGAL

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Contemporary Portuguese society can be considered a laboratory for intercultural dialogue. As a result of the country's colonizing past, it is now connected by linguistic and cultural bonds with many different areas of the world. A special place in the socio-cultural landscape of Portugal has been occupied for decades by immigrants from former African colonies and their descendants, referred to as *afrodescendentes.* They have a particular, "mediated" relationship with the colonial past, transmitted by their parents' or ancestors' generation or/and via media discourse and cultural texts. They often respond to this complicated "received history" through various practices of post-memory (Hirsch 2008). [20] Afrodescendants try to reinterpret this difficult past in different ways. References to colonial history and reflections on contemporary forms of racial discrimination are recurring themes in the social debates which they initiate. Their narratives echo what B. de Sousa Santos highlighted: colonialism as a form of social relations has lasted longer than colonialism as a political system.

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[20] Postmemory may be applied to people who have not experienced these events first-hand, but feel an emotional bond and struggle with experiences inherited from their ancestors.

Despite well-functioning institutions aimed at supporting the integration of immigrants and social cohesion (ACM, CNAIM) [21] and Portugal's high position in the MIPEX ranking, [22] organizations and associations connecting people of African descent point to evident cases of discrimination and to the biased narrative regarding colonialism and the presence of African cultures in Portugal. One of the organizations that seeks to overcome the dominant Europocentric vision of history and hegemonic interpretations of colonialism is *Djass - Associação de Afrodescendentes.* Established in Lisbon in 2016, the Afrodescendants Association has been actively involved in developing strategies for decolonizing memory and public spaces for several years. At the heart of their activity is the protection of the rights of Afrodescendants in Portugal and the prevention of racism. Djass activists contest the Eurocentric version of history and propose its reinterpretation, emphasizing the African contribution to the development of knowledge and culture. They encourage people of African descent to participate actively in political life. Djass conducts debates, educational projects, and training events on racism, colonialism, and African identities. It has undertaken, among others, social interventions to introduce reliable information about African cultures into Portuguese history textbooks. Outwardly, the curricula in Portuguese schools are still based on a *conservative and Eurocentric approach to Portuguese history, namely a teleological concept of time, a geographical analysis based on the dichotomy of the center and periphery, and a depoliticized narrative of the colonial period* (Sena Martins, Moura 2018:17). As part of the *Djass Arte* series, the association promoted the art of African artists. During the Book Fair in Lisbon in June 2017, representatives of Djass led a cycle of meetings with authors of African descent and supported the promotion of their books.[23] A pilot project (*Djumbai Descolonial*) in collaboration with the Museum of Natural History and Science has also been launched to develop a new contextualization of the collections presented in the Ethnographic Museum and Tropical Garden in Lisbon. The main idea was that to present the history of various

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[21]*Alto Comissariado para as Migrações* (ACM)/High Commissioner for Migration; *Centro Nacional de Apoio à Integração de Migrantes* (CNAIM) – National Support Centre for the Integration of Migrants.

[22]See Migrant Integration Policy Index, data regarding Portugal: https://www.mipex.eu/portugal
[23]*Vozes Afrikanas na Feira do Livro em Lisboa* (African Voices at the Lisbon Book Fair), see the description of the initiative "Vozes Afrikanas" – percurso on Feira do Livro de Lisboa – DJASS 16 XI 2022

exhibits, brought from "anthropological missions" in the 1930s from former Portuguese colonies in Africa, from a different perspective.[24]

As the postmemory researchers have argued, the traumatic past reveals itself to the subsequent generations and cannot be easily pushed to the margins. It requires a clear reference to what Susan Sontag called *the pain of others* (Sontag 2001). The question of *what do we owe the victims* (Hirsch 2008: 104) returns. It seems that the latest project created on the initiative of Djass, i.e. the Memorial to Enslaved People, is an attempt to answer this question. In 2017, the Djass association, in collaboration with anti-racist activists and researchers, came up with the initiative to create a memorial to the victims of slavery in Lisbon. Three artists of African origin responded to the invitation to prepare the design of the future monument. Through a public vote held in various places in and around Lisbon (in venues where African diaspora is present), one of them was chosen. The author of the winning project entitled *Plantation–Prosperity and Nightmare* was Kiluanji Kia Henda, a conceptual artist born in 1979 in Luanda. Kia Henda, whose works have been exhibited in Lisbon, Dakar, Sao Paulo, and Venice, uses various forms of artistic expression, such as photography, experimental theater, installations, music or sculpture. In his work, he undertakes a critical reflection on the contemporary reality, including politics, colonial history, and memory. Identity, the past, and the future are important themes of Henda's works. In response to the invitation launched by the Djass association Henda designed an installation depicting a sugar cane plantation (540 3-meter-high aluminum elements with an amphitheater placed between them). The project received funding from the civic budget of the city of Lisbon. The monument was to be erected at *Campo das Cebolas* on the Tagus waterfront in the first trimester of 2021. The artist realized his work and has been keeping it in storage for many months. However, it is not known when exactly it will stand in the place agreed with the city authorities. All the more so, because since the change of authorities in October 2021 (the socialist Fernando Medina lost the election and Carlos Moedas from the more centrist PSD party took over as mayor of Lisbon), provocative questions about whether Lisbon will really "admit" its participation in slavery have been raised. It remains to be hoped that the new city

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[24]*Djumbai* is a social practice from Guinea-Bissau; a type of social gathering or community gathering to discuss current issues.

authorities will manage to fulfill their commitment during the "Decade of Afrodescendants" (Plácido Júnior 2021).

The promoters of the project emphasize that the monument is not only to commemorate enslaved people and recall the role Portugal played in the global slave trade, but also to sensitize people to various contemporary forms of oppression and discrimination. It is also intended to highlight the contribution of African cultures to the development of Portugal. Henda believes that the memorial is meant to be a symbolic voice for those silenced or left out, their representation in the public space that has been missing in Lisbon so far. According to the artist, through this commemoration and willingness to listen to those discriminated against so far, a process of symbolic reparation takes place. As he says: *the purpose of this memorial is that we do not fall into collective amnesia* (Kiluanji Kia Henda 2021).

While analyzing various initiatives run by Afrodescendants in Portugal it is relevant to mention the International Decade for People of African Descent (2015- 2024), established by UNESCO and its impact on different project promoting African cultures emerged in the last years. It is also worth remarking that the functioning of Afrodescendants in Portuguese society can be analyzed today from a postcolonial perspective, but also in the broader context of complex intercultural relations. Their activity goes beyond issues directly related to racism and colonialism, as evidenced by a wide range of socio-cultural or artistic initiatives undertaken by African organizations. They engage in a dialogue with the mainstream Eurocentric way of thinking, posing uncomfortable questions about responsibility and the contemporary consequences of colonization. But they also point to the richness of African cultural heritage in Portugal and the contribution of Africans to the development of Portuguese society, thus going beyond the "victim perspective" and accentuating their agency and subjectivity even more strongly.

Questions for students

1. What remnants of the colonial era are still present in contemporary Portugal?

2. What is the link between colonialism and contemporary racism?

3. What is the role of the young generation of African descent from former Portuguese colonies in the contemporary postcolonial debate?

4. Is it possible to decolonize Portuguese public/urban spaces and collective memory? What actions/practices are needed to achieve this goal?

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Useful links

- High Commissioner for Migration, https://www.acm.gov.pt/inicio [in Portuguese]

- National Support Centre for the Integration of Migrants, https://www.acm.gov.pt/pt/-/cnai-lisboa

- Webpage of the UNESCO Decade of People of African Descent International Decade for People of African Descent | United Nations

- Migrant Integration Policy Index, data regarding Portugal: https://www.mipex.eu/portugal

- Website of *Djass* - Afrodescendants Association https://djass.pt/en/ [in English]

- Website of the Memorial to Enslaved People English | Memorial de homenagem às pessoas escravizadas - Lisboa (memorialescravatura.com)

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- Website of the research project "Remapping Memories" ReMapping Memories Lisboa – Hamburg - Latitude - Rethinking Power Relations – for a decolonised and non-racial world - Goethe-Institut,

Audio-video materials available online

- Batoto Yetu Portugal Tertulia Presença Africana em Portugal - YouTube a seminar about the "African presence" in Portugal by Isabel Castro Henriques, organised with the support of the Portuguese Institute for Youth and Sports and in partnership with Casa Mocambo

- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SOLFp8eap1U - a documentary about the Afro-Brazilian roots of fado: *Fado Dançado* (Danced Fado), by Batoto Yetu Portugal association

- 'A Descoberta': uma ação de 2007 que se estende no tempo - YouTube. A video illustrating the work " A Descoberta" by Kiluanji Kia Henda, registered and edited by Marta Lança

A (POTENTIALLY) NEW FACE OF RESILIENCE BUILDING IN EU MEDITERRANEAN NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY. UNDERSTANDING CHANGING NARRATIVES ON THE SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION POLICY PARADIGMS.

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The sudden inflow of irregular migrants in the Mediterranean region that followed tectonic shifts in its socio-political landscape accelerated already existing fears among EU Southern Neighborhood member states long before what was later heralded as the Arab Spring. EU policy-makers had to face a challenge that – in political rhetoric and policy-making – became an existential threat. The challenge has been about how to strike a balance between fostering democratization and societal resilience on the one hand, and consolidation and state-resilience, on the other. Above all, the nature of the challenge, which has become a threat, has been about adopting a language and policy instruments by EU policy-makers that would have offered stability in their turbulent neighborhood and security at home.

Since the Arab Spring it has been a long journey for EU institutions, EU member states policy-makers, as well as public opinion to find common ground in an otherwise increasingly polarized societal matrix on how to ensure security at home and foster change in their fragile neighborhood.

In order to understand and explain how this challenge became a threat, and how it has been dealt with, adopting a conceptual framework offering a comprehensive analytical perspective on the migration-security nexus is crucial. The securitization theory developed by Ole Waever (1993, 2011) and more broadly by the Copenhagen School allows one to reach the core of how migration becomes a security problem (Bigo, 2002).

Adopting such a conceptual perspective is vital to understanding migration policy-making in the EU after 2011. More precisely, it provides a comprehensive analytical horizon

for resilience-building that became key narrative for the EU after the adoption of the Global Strategy of 2016. Approaching EU migration policy-making in the Mediterranean region through the conceptual lens of securitization theory sheds more light on the securitization narrative that has been implicitly embedded in the logic and rationale of the EU Southern Neighborhood policy since 2011.

Let us now discuss key concepts of this analytical perspective. First, an outline of major assumptions of securitization theory as developed by Ole Weaver (1993, 2011) and their relevance to unpacking political rhetoric on "migration as security problem" (Bigo, 2002) will be provided. The chapter will then discuss how the logic and rationale of the EU resilience-building in the Mediterranean region have been heavily impacted by the securitization paradigm since the adoption of the EU Global Strategy (2016) and the New Agenda for the Mediterranean (2021).

The canonic version of securitization theory coined by Ole Weaver (1993, 2011) is based on existence of a security threat through the means of political communication. As assumed by Weaver (1993, 2011) this security threat is identified by a securitizing actor, usually a government or political leader, as a matter of emergency and urgency. The security threat becomes real situation when it is addressed to the relevant audiences. Security is, thus – according to Weaver's orthodoxy – a speech act. The securitization of a referent object is successful when the relevant audience accepts the logic of emergency and urgency to counter the threat. However, when the relevant audience, usually civil society, is not convinced about the objective nature of allegedly existential threat, the entire rhetoric of emergency and urgency falls down, which leads to so-called de-securitization (Weaver, 2011).

The standard version of securitization theory has been substantially revised and expanded by Didier Bigo (2002) and Thierry Balzacq (2011, 2016) among others. Thierry Balzacq offered an extended catalogue of securitization practices, which allows the composition of a more comprehensive picture of whether the security speech act made by the securitizing actor is found convincing or not by the relevant audience. Balzacq's working conceptualization of securitization is built on the following reasoning: "'[securitization is] an articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artefacts (metaphors, policy tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, emotions, etc.) are contextually mobilised by a securitizing actor, who works to prompt an audience to build a coherent network

of implications (feelings, sensations, thoughts, and intuitions) about the critical vulnerability of a referent object, that concurs with the securitizing actor's reasons for choices and actions, by investing the referent subject with such an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion that a customised policy must be immediately undertaken to block it.'[25]

By adopting a broader spectrum of securitizing practices and symbolic interactions involved in securitization speech acts, we find ourselves in a better position to grasp the full complexity of the migration-security nexus as an essential dimension of the EU Southern Neighborhood Policy resilience-building. An empirical illustration of the securitization of the EU Mediterranean Neighborhood policy is the resilience-building strategy introduced in the EU Global Strategy (2016) as well as in the New Agenda for the Mediterranean (2016). Securitization of resilience-building is implicitly present in the EU Global Strategy's grand design of stability-building in its turbulent neighborhood. This was particularly relevant for the overall EU migration policy-making strategy after the Arab Spring.

As correctly diagnosed by Eric Stollenwerk, Tanja A. Börzel, and Thomas Risse (2021) following Korosteleva, Elena A., and Trine Flockhart (2020):[26] "resilience-building moves away from state-centric approaches towards governance-building and peace-building "from below" and "bottom up". Resilience-building puts societal actors, local communities, and even individuals front and center of the strategy. If taken seriously, it requires the EU to essentially overhaul its overly state-centric strategies of capacity-building towards strengthening the adaptive capacities of societies and local communities in its eastern and southern neighbourhoods. Resilience-building entails engagement with non-state actors, including non-state justice institutions and even violent actors."[27]

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[25] Thierry Balzacq, 'A Theory of Securitization: Origins, Core Assumptions, and Variants', in: Thierry Balzacq (ed.), *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve* (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 3. cited in: Balzacq, T., Leonard, S., & Ruzicka, J. (2016). 'Securitization' revisited: theory and cases. International Relations, 30(4), 494-531.

[26] Stollenwerk, E., Börzel, T. A., & Risse, T. (2021). Theorizing resilience-building in the EU's neighbourhood: introduction to the special issue. Democratization, 28(7), 1219-1238; See also: Korosteleva, Elena A., and Trine Flockhart, Resilience in EU and International Institutions. Special Issue." Contemporary Security Policy 41, no. 2 (2020)

[27] Ibid.

Such an analytical perspective seems to offer an insightful perspective on securitization narratives applied to migration policy in light of resilience-building in the EU Mediterranean Neighborhood after the Arab Spring.

Questions for students:

1. Discuss the explanatory power of securitization theory (Weaver, Balzacq, Bigo) and its relevance to the migration-policy of EU institutions and EU member states policy-makers after the Arab Spring.
2. Discuss the resilience-building rationale adopted in the EU Global Strategy and the New Partnership for the Mediterranean.
3. Discuss the complementarity dilemma between state resilience-building and societal resilience-building seen through the conceptual lens of the EU Global Strategy and the New Partnership for the Mediterranean.

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TRANSCONTINENTAL MEDITERRANEAN INTERSECTIONS: AN EXPLORATION OF HISTORICAL, GEOPOLITICAL, AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DYNAMICS SHAPING MIGRATION PATTERNS IN CEUTA AND MELILLA

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Part one: Crossroads of Continents: A Historical and Geopolitical Examination of Migration Trends in Ceuta and Melilla

The Historical Tapestry of Ceuta and Melilla

On a remarkable day, May 18th, 2021, the world watched as Ceuta, a Spanish enclave in North Africa, experienced an extraordinary event. An astounding 8,000 immigrants crossed its border from Morocco in a single day, accounting for about 10% of Ceuta's total population. This incident was unparalleled, but it brought into sharp focus a pattern that has been evolving since the early 1990s – a steady and increasing influx of immigrants into Ceuta and Melilla.

This raises several questions that require a deep dive into the history and geopolitical significance of these enclaves.

Ceuta and Melilla are Spanish territories, but they are not on the Iberian Peninsula. Instead, they are perched on the northern coast of Africa, near the Strait of Gibraltar. From an aerial view, one would see Ceuta first, followed by a border marked by a red line separating it from Moroccan territory. Flying further east for approximately 400 kilometers, one would then encounter Melilla, which is even smaller than Ceuta.

These enclaves have a rich and layered history. The Roman Empire founded both Ceuta and Melilla, and they initially belonged to the Mauretania Tingitana province, signifying Rome's foothold in North Africa. In the third century, a wave of administrative changes swept through the Roman Empire, and Ceuta and Melilla were reassigned to the province of Hispania. However, the decline of the Western Roman Empire in the fifth century gave rise to new powers and the lands of Ceuta and Melilla went through several transitions.

By the seventh century, the Umayyad Dynasty rose to power, bringing with it Islamic rule. This period was significant for both enclaves, as trade networks prospered due to their strategic locations. Ceuta, in particular, became a vital port and a bridge between North Africa and Europe. Along with economic progress, the region was imbued with Islamic art and architecture, which shaped the urban landscapes of Ceuta and Melilla.

Fast-forward to the 15th century, and Ceuta and Melilla were coveted by European forces. The Portuguese captured Ceuta in 1415, under Prince Henry the Navigator. Later in the same century, Melilla was captured by the Spanish. Despite the tumultuous politics of the time, including a brief period of Iberian Union, Ceuta and Melilla have remained under Spanish control to this day, functioning similarly to other autonomous communities within Spain.

The Geopolitical Significance and Migration

Over the centuries, various powers in the region aspired to regain control over Ceuta and Melilla. These aspirations intensified after Morocco gained independence in 1956. The cities, with their strategic locations, were viewed as historical and geopolitically significant territories.

One notable attempt in the 18th century involved the Moroccan sultanate collaborating with the British to try to capture Ceuta.

Another layer to the enclaves' geopolitical complexity is their inclusion in the Schengen Area. Spain joined the Schengen Area in 1995, and Ceuta and Melilla, being Spanish territories, were consequently included. This essentially allows for the free movement of people within the area formed by the member countries. Although internal borders were abolished, external border controls remained, making Ceuta and Melilla points of entry into Europe from Africa.

Now, let us turn our attention to the heart of the matter - migration to Ceuta and Melilla. Understanding the migration pressures requires an analysis at multiple levels. It's important to consider the global geopolitical scenarios and historical background that have shaped migration trends. Furthermore, classical immigration theories help us understand the motivations behind migration.

Part Two: Transcontinental Movements: A Comprehensive Analysis of the Socio-Economic and Geopolitical Factors Influencing African Migration to Europe

Introduction to Migration Factors

Migration has been an essential aspect of human history. The movement of people from one geographical area to another is influenced by various factors. In this book, we focus on the migration from African countries to the European Union. We'll explore the factors that facilitate this movement and understand the intricate nature of migration.

Economic Disparities and Migration

A critical factor influencing migration is economic disparity between regions. The average annual income in Europe stands at $38,000, while in North Africa and the Middle East it is $7,700, and in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is significantly lower at $1,600. The massive income gap makes Europe an attractive destination for individuals seeking better economic opportunities.

Besides income disparities, job opportunities and better living conditions act as pull factors. Many African migrants are skilled laborers or professionals who seek job opportunities that are either unavailable or poorly compensated in their home countries.

Violence, Conflict, and Migration

Violence and conflicts in countries of origin also significantly influence migration. African countries with high levels of civil conflicts and domestic violence witness a large number of their citizens migrating to safer regions, and Europe often becomes a destination of choice. For instance, regions like the Congo, Nigeria, Mali, Somalia, Sudan, and Ethiopia have been plagued by conflicts.

These conflicts can be based on ethnic, religious, or political lines. The legacy of colonization, where boundaries were drawn without consideration for ethnic communities, plays a role in the ongoing conflicts. Additionally, religious tensions, such as those seen in Nigeria and Sudan, contribute to violence and consequently migration.

Sociopolitical Factors and Policy Influence

Corruption levels and government policies also play an integral part in migration. High levels of corruption in African countries push individuals to seek more transparent and fair governance systems, usually found in European countries. Furthermore, government policies both in Africa and Europe can either deter or encourage migration.

Historical ties between countries also factor in. The colonial history between European countries and Africa has led to cultural and administrative similarities in some cases. These similarities make it easier for migrants from former colonies to assimilate into European countries, thus acting as a pull factor.

Language and Migration

Language is one of the most significant factors influencing migration. During colonization, European powers established their languages as official languages in the colonies. As a result, many Africans are conversant in French, English, or Portuguese. This linguistic familiarity acts as a pull factor, as migrants prefer destinations where they can communicate efficiently.

Geographical Proximity and Infrastructure

Geographical proximity is a determining factor in migration. Closer geographical locations lower the cost and complexity of migration. For example, North African countries like Algeria and Morocco see more migration to Europe compared to Southern African countries.

The improvement of transport infrastructure in Africa, such as the Trans-Sahara Highway, has also facilitated migration. Despite some parts being in poor condition, it serves as a vital connection between North and South Africa. This infrastructural development has made crossing the Sahara Desert, which historically acted as a barrier, more feasible for many migrants.

Part Three. The Geopolitical Tapestry of Ceuta and Melilla: Strategic Enclaves at the Crossroads

Setting the Scene

In the northernmost tip of Africa, situated along the Mediterranean coast, are two Spanish enclaves called Ceuta and Melilla. These cities are nestled in a region that boasts a rich tapestry of history, culture, and geopolitical significance. They have been witnesses to the ebbs and flows of empires and have stood at the crossroads of continents. To understand the importance of Ceuta and Melilla, it is essential to recognize the role they play in the interplay between the European and African continents and in the complex web of relationships they share with neighboring countries. The history of Ceuta and Melilla

is deeply intertwined with the story of the Strait of Gibraltar, which separates Europe from Africa and acts as a gateway between the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea.

For centuries, powers vied for control of this strategic passage. In ancient times, the Roman Empire controlled the Strait of Gibraltar, which later fell under the rule of the Caliphate of Morocco, Moroccan Sultanates, and then the Spanish Empire. Eventually, during the 18th century, the British established a foothold in Gibraltar. In the more recent past, after World War II, the United States established a presence near the Strait through an agreement with Spain, effectively making the U.S. a significant player in the region.

Strategic Significance

Ceuta's proximity to the Strait of Gibraltar grants it a global and regional significance. The Strait is critical for maritime trade routes, offering a shorter and more economical path through the Mediterranean Sea and the Suez Canal as opposed to circumnavigating the Cape of Good Hope. This has far-reaching implications not just in times of peace, but in conflict as well. For instance, during wartime, access to a shorter route can be the difference between victory and defeat. Furthermore, in an economic context, taking the longer route around the Cape of Good Hope means higher transportation costs, which can render industries less competitive due to increased prices of goods and raw materials. This, in turn, affects the general population, leading to a diminished quality of life.

However, control over the Strait requires a formidable navy. Neither Spain nor Morocco possesses a navy of this caliber. This void has been filled by global powers such as the United States, which maintains partnerships with both Spain and Morocco, and seeks to prevent conflict between these two critical players in the region.

The Politics of Neighboring Tensions

Turning to a regional perspective, the story of Ceuta and Melilla is also one of geopolitical maneuverings and tensions among neighbors. After Morocco's independence, it faced conflicts with Algeria and Spain. Morocco and Algeria have had longstanding hostilities since a territorial

dispute in 1963 over the provinces of Tindouf and Bechar. This created a domino effect of regional tensions, with Algeria supporting the Sahrawi people against Morocco, and the United States and France backing Morocco.

Additionally, tensions simmered between Morocco and Spain. In 1975, Morocco seized control of the Western Sahara region during Spain's political transition. Though Spain expected a referendum to be held among the Sahrawi people to determine their fate, Morocco rejected this proposal, leaving the issue unresolved.

Modern Day Complications

More recently, in 2020, Morocco took the international community by surprise when it recognized Israel, one of the few Arab countries to do so. In return, the United States recognized Morocco's sovereignty over the former Spanish Sahara, weakening Spain's position in the region. The following year, tensions escalated between Spain and Morocco when Ghali, the leader of the Sahrawi Polisario Front, was allowed into Spain for cancer treatment. This sparked a diplomatic crisis, with Morocco responding by allowing a massive influx of migrants into Ceuta.

Conclusion:

Migrations are influenced by a multitude of factors including geography, shared history, language, past colonial relationships, and economic disparities. In the context of Ceuta and Melilla, their strategic locations near the Strait of Gibraltar play a crucial role in the migration patterns observed. Migrations are not arbitrary and entail costs for all parties involved.

Questions for students

1. How did the historical shifts in power, from the Roman Empire to the Umayyad Dynasty and later European control, shape the geopolitical significance of Ceuta and Melilla as strategic enclaves between Africa and Europe?

2. Analyze the role of the Schengen Area in relation to Ceuta and Melilla, and explain how their inclusion in this Area impacts the migration trends observed in these enclaves, particularly as entry points into Europe from Africa.

3. In the context of economic disparities as a driving factor for migration, discuss the differences in average annual income between Europe, North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa, and how these disparities contribute to the influx of migrants into Ceuta and Melilla.

4. How did the diplomatic crisis between Spain and Morocco in 2021, triggered by the admission for medical treatment in Spain of Sahrawi Polisario Front leader Ghali, impact the migration dynamics in Ceuta, and what was Morocco's response?

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THE GRANDEUR OF THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA

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Understanding the Mediterranean's Geographical Significance

The remarkable geographical feature known as the Mediterranean Sea, affectionately termed the "old Mare Nostrum," sits impressively within the northern hemisphere. Spanning an impressive 46,000 kilometers, it boasts the title of the largest inland sea on Earth. Its size rivals that of the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Bengal. However, the Mediterranean

Sea outshines these with a longer coastline and a size slightly smaller than the continent of Australia, covering around 2.5 million square kilometers.

The Mediterranean Sea serves as a unique intersection between three significant landmasses: Asia, Africa, and Europe. This unique positioning places it as the geographical epicenter of Earth. The region witnesses a vibrant interplay between landmasses and seas, aided by the presence of numerous islands and peninsulas, enabling an intimate relationship between the sea and those dwelling along its coastlines.

The densely populated coasts led to the need for communication and connection across shores, ultimately sparking the evolution of the cartographic discipline and advancing geography in the region.

The Intricate Historical Tapestry of the Mediterranean

The Mediterranean Sea has traditionally been a crucible of civilizations. Throughout history, various powers vied for control of the sea and its shores, thereby dictating trade routes. Instances include the coexistence of the Phoenicians with the Egyptians, and the Romans with the Carthaginians. A unique exception to this dynamic was when the Roman Empire managed to control the entire Mediterranean coastline, hence their term From the 8th century onwards, the rise of the Umayyad empire divided the Mediterranean into two sides: the Muslim shore and the Christian shore. This division fostered stronger internal connections within these subregions rather than across them, reflecting in contemporary geopolitical structures such as the European Union and the Arab League.

Focusing on the Northern Shore.

The Rich Diversity of the Northern Mediterranean

The northern shoreline of the Mediterranean, extending from the Strait of Gibraltar to the Bosporus Strait, is a complex array of smaller regions, each with its unique characteristics. Despite these differences, the regions share common elements such as similar climatic

conditions, flora, fauna, and topography influenced by the collision of the African and European tectonic plates.

These shared traits allow for the cultivation of similar agricultural products, giving birth to the famed "Mediterranean diet." A diet renowned for its life-prolonging benefits.

Historical maritime transport efficiency resulted in better connectivity between these sub-regions. This prolonged interaction over centuries led to similarities in customs, arts, and lifestyle. However, alongside these shared features, the northern shore also faces common challenges like environmental issues due to human activities and functional connectivity problems.

Toward Supra-regional Integration

Functional connectivity between regions significantly impacts their performance, integration, and growth. To address these issues, the European Commission, in the 1990s, began analyzing smaller regions at a subnational level, leading to the concept of "supra-regional blocks." These blocks of regions, despite belonging to different nations, shared functional relationships and common characteristics. One such supra-regional unit identified was the northern shore of the Mediterranean, termed the "Mediterranean Arch" by the European Commission in 1999.

Differing Dynamics of Western and Eastern Mediterranean

The Latin Arch: Western Mediterranean

Despite the overarching label of the Mediterranean Arch, functional relationships between the western and eastern regions of the Mediterranean vary substantially. The western region, known as the "Latin Arch," enjoys more intense interaction amongst its subregions due to historical context and the presence of an almost continuous urbanized area, stretching from Cádiz to Rome.

The Eastern Mediterranean Challenge

Contrastingly, the eastern Mediterranean shore, spanning the south of the Italian Peninsula and Greece, lacks a continuous urbanized region and terrestrial transport connections. The post-Cold War and Balkan War integration of certain Balkan Peninsula countries into the European Union could potentially lead to terrestrial connection to Greece. However, a continuous cityscape throughout the entire eastern shore remains unlikely.

Ultimately, the formation of supra-regional blocks seeks to devise strategies to enhance economic development, reduce disparities between regions, and foster functional connections between regions.

Examining the Supra-Regional Concept in the Mediterranean Regions

Macro-Regional Equivalence and Regional Connectivity

The proposition of a supra-regional structure in Mediterranean regions infers that there should be relatively balanced development throughout this macro-region, fostering an environment where regions are well-linked. A traditional metric for measuring such development is GDP per capita, representing the monetary value of all goods and services produced in a region per year, divided by the population of that region.

Consider the Latin Arc's GDP per capita distribution in 1993: the Italian side of the region was wealthier, suggesting higher-value goods and services production in comparison to the Latin Arc's western side. However, Catalonia in Spain and Provence Alpes in France were notable exceptions. Between 1983 and 1993, the Spanish Mediterranean demonstrated accelerated growth compared to the rest of the Latin Arc.

An interesting observation is that development in the Latin Arc is geographically dispersed, with significant centers like Catalonia, Provence-Alps-French Riviera, and Lazio region contributing to the Mediterranean's socio-economic fabric.

The French Recluss Research Group and the "Blue Banana" Region

Map1, produced by French research group Recluss, illustrates cross-border supraregions in the European Union, transcending state borders and catalyzing economic growth. Roger Brunet, Recluss's founder, argues for a redefined spatial logic within the EU to enhance integration and streamline economic progress by circumventing redundancies caused by internal borders.

A notable feature is a high-income region continuum - referred to as the "blue banana" by Recluss - spanning eight countries and starting in London and ending in Milan. Hosting a population of 100 million, the region is a high-value goods and services production hub, rivalling global powerhouses such as California, the northeastern U.S. coast, and Tokyo.

Contentions and Economic Differences

The Latin Arc's delineation is a contested topic. Certain scholars argue for the inclusion of regions such as Andalusia, the Balearic Islands, and Sardinia. Based on Gaudemar's definition of the "Latin Arch," Professor Llorens suggests a region in the northwestern Mediterranean that includes these contested regions.

However, this is not universally accepted as regions like Sardinia, Murcia, and eastern Andalusia exhibit different value-added activities than Rome, Marseille, or Catalonia. For instance, the former are heavily focused on agro-industry, while the latter gravitate towards high-tech industries or services.

An ethnocentric bias is observable when establishing dynamic flows for regional policies, with regional science professionals often favoring their own regions. For example, a workshop by the Institut Català de Estudis Mediterranis primarily revolved around Catalonia's role in the Arc despite the inclusion of Andalusian geographers.

Future Directions for the Supra-Regional Blocks

The Evolving Role of Supra-Regions in Territorial Planning

Despite challenges to cohesion in the Mediterranean Arc, shared characteristics and problems across these regions imply that certain common regional policy measures could be effective. However, supra-regions should not be perceived as precise geographical blocks suitable for territorial planning, but rather as evolving entities to support development strategies.

During the time of German reunification and the eastward shift of the European Union's geopolitical weight, the concept of supra-regional blocks emerged, combining territorial analysis with the formulation of suitable regional and territorial policy measures for each block. Within this framework, the Mediterranean Arc, extending from Andalusia to Greece, was outlined, highlighting the need for differentiated strategies for the Latin Arc and the central Mediterranean.

Bridging the Gap through Transport Infrastructure

Peripheral regions such as the Italian Mesogiorno and Greece demonstrate a strong interest in investing in transport infrastructure. Establishing effective trans-European and secondary networks is vital, with a focus on improving North-South links in the Mesogiorno and communication with the western coast of Greece. The Latin Arc faces significant disparities within its structure, with economically advanced regions like the Balearic Islands and Catalonia contrasting with less developed areas like Andalusia. However, economic development is more homogeneous among the regions in the French-Italian Latin Arc.

European Supraregions and the Role of Key Metropolitan Areas

Economies of Scale and the Driving Metropolises

Europe 2000+ document outlines a three-pronged approach for the evolution of European supraregions. The first action line places the economic and transportation spotlight

on the primary urban centers in the Latin Arc - Rome, Barcelona, and Marseille. Together, these cities are home to about 11 million people, accounting for a significant one-third of the Latin Arc population.

The economies of scale achieved by these metropolitan areas are key to the overall development and the attraction of industrial investments in the region. Let's delve into how economies of scale affect each city.

Rome's rich historical and cultural heritage draws millions of tourists annually. This influx leads to a substantial growth in industries such as hospitality, retail, and transportation, resulting in economies of scale and increased competitiveness.

Barcelona's tech and renewable energy sectors, strengthened by its flourishing startup ecosystem and focus on digital transformation, reap the benefits of economies of scale, which results in cost reduction and increased funds for research and development.

Marseille, a vibrant port city, leverages its strategic position for growth in the shipping, logistics, and biotechnology industries. The economies of scale here enhance efficiency and competitiveness, subsequently boosting overall economic performance.

Environmental Challenges in the Mediterranean Basin. The Tug of War Between Progress and Environmental Degradation

The second line of action proposed in the Europe 2000+ document involves battling environmental degradation. As economic growth and urbanization accelerated in the Latin Arc, they brought along environmental challenges like urban sprawl, air pollution, water pollution, and waste management.

The rapid expansion of cities to accommodate growing economies leads to the destruction of natural habitats and agricultural land. Coupled with increased resource demand, this growth exerts significant pressure on regional ecosystems and biodiversity. Similarly, intensified industrial activities and increased vehicular usage contribute to a dramatic rise in harmful pollutants, impacting air quality and aggravating climate change.

Water pollution is another growing issue in the region, stemming from the discharge of untreated wastewater into water bodies and the excessive use of fertilizers in agriculture. The rapid urbanization also results in an upsurge of solid waste production, contributing to air and soil pollution and producing greenhouse gases that intensify climate change.

Enhancing Relations with Other Supraregional Blocks

Bolstering Interactions and Infrastructure Improvements

The third action line involves strengthening relationships with other supraregional blocks within the Community, primarily those in central and dynamic areas. Improved communication and transportation infrastructure, like bolstering connections between Andalusia and Murcia, reducing transport fractures in the Valencia community, and developing the Barcelona-Genoa axis, are proposed to enable this. These efforts have been viewed as the nascent stages of the Mediterranean Corridor concept, a topic frequently discussed in press and political literature.

Divergence in Progress Across European Regions

EU cohesion policies, backed by European funds, have been successful in some regions like the Portuguese Algarve and Ireland, both part of the Atlantic Arc, and some regions of the continental diagonal in France. However, southern regions of Italy, Spain, and Greece have had more modest gains, remaining peripheral.

The efficacy of cohesion policies differs across regions due to several factors including governance and administration challenges, economic complexities, and regional disparities, which particularly affect the Latin Arc.

Lessons from the East

Eastern European countries, like Hungary, have been gaining ground, achieving human development and per capita income indices higher than the peripheral Mediterranean regions. This progress is linked directly to their employment rate and population's educational level.

Eastern countries have adopted economic reforms, integrated into the EU, liberalized their labor markets, and leveraged their competitive advantages, leading to accelerated growth. In contrast, some regions of the Latin Arc have struggled due to bureaucracy, inefficient governance, and insufficient investment in innovation and infrastructure.

The Mediterranean Corridor: An Evolving Infrastructural Giant

Growth Amid Challenges

The Mediterranean Corridor, despite its initial exclusion of regions like Andalusia, has evolved into a 3000-kilometer-long multimodal link between the Mediterranean ports and the EU's center. This corridor provides an east-west link through the southern part of the EU, enhancing intermodality in sensitive areas.

Despite the evolution, there's a clear yielding to the EU's centripetal forces in the strategies for the Mediterranean regions as part of a supraregional bloc. Yet, the Mediterranean's geo-strategic weight remains undeniable, with one of the world's densest communication routes and a rate of growth exceeding that of the North Sea super-ports. The exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union further amplifies this strategic weight.

Rediscovering Thalassocracy in a Globalized World

Global Economic Shift and the Strategic Importance of Thalassocracy

Today's globalized world has reignited interest in the concept of thalassocracy, with nations across the globe reassessing their strategies around maritime trade routes and resources.

In this context, the Mediterranean region has gained significant attention due to its strategic location and historically influential role in maritime dominance.

The data suggests that the Mediterranean region, given its GDP growth, foreign direct investment, and international trade volume, is primed for capitalizing on the possibilities of global economic integration. Its strategic location between Europe, Africa, and Asia, along with a vast coastline and established port infrastructure, play crucial roles in this favorable outlook.

The region's rich history of maritime trade and cultural exchange equips it with a nuanced understanding of thalassocracy's complexities and the skills to overcome its challenges. This heritage, along with the region's natural resources and growing economic power, could thrust the Mediterranean region into a leading position in global trade and development.

The region's potential is further bolstered by the rising emphasis on sustainable development and the blue economy. These principles aim to balance economic growth, social progress, and marine ecosystem preservation. Thus, by sustainably harnessing maritime resources, the Mediterranean region could enhance its thalassocratic dominance and contribute towards a more balanced and eco-friendly global economy.

Port Traffic Density, Migration, and New Regional Paradigms

The growing port traffic in the Mediterranean region, coupled with increasing migration from North Africa and the Middle East, has recentered the focus on the Mare Nostrum. This scenario brings forth new paradigms concerning the region's future role within the "Europe of the regions" context, notably Africa's demographic projection and the implementation of sea motorways.

The surge in Mediterranean port traffic results from the swift expansion of global trade and the growing interconnectedness of worldwide economies. While this presents opportunities for the Mediterranean countries, it also raises challenges around balancing economic growth with natural resource and ecosystem preservation. In addition, burgeoning

maritime trade implies further infrastructure demands, calling for investments in port facilities, transportation networks, and logistics capabilities.

Meanwhile, migration pressures from North Africa and the Middle East introduce complexities around managing migration flows. A blend of factors, including conflict, economic difficulties, and climate change, drive these migrations, significantly impacting the region's socio-economic and political fabric. Addressing these migrations necessitates cooperative strategies among Mediterranean countries and the broader European Union, aiming for humane treatment of migrants while also tackling the causes of their displacement.

Future Paradigms and the Mediterranean's Role

These developments refocus attention on the Mare Nostrum, contributing to the emergence of new paradigms for its future within the "Europe of the regions". Africa's anticipated demographic boom will influence the Mediterranean region as it grapples with the potential socio-economic and environmental repercussions of increased migration, trade, and resource demands.

Similarly, the implementation of the sea motorways, a European Union initiative aimed at enhancing maritime transport links and promoting sustainable transportation, will shape the region's future. By improving maritime transport's efficiency and sustainability, the sea motorways could foster economic integration, stimulate growth, and facilitate the movement of goods and people across the Mediterranean.

Given these emerging paradigms, there is a need to reassess the geo-strategic conception of the Mediterranean regions and their functional relationships, as outlined in the 1990s. This evaluation, considering contemporary opportunities and challenges, will enable a more nuanced understanding of the Mediterranean's role within the "Europe of the regions" and pave the way for innovative strategies for 21st-century complexities.

Questions for students

1. Discuss the differences in the success of EU cohesion policies across various regions, as highlighted in the text. What factors contribute to these disparities, and how might these issues be addressed to improve policy efficacy?

2. Analyze the significance of the Mediterranean Corridor in the broader context of EU infrastructure and trade. What are the potential benefits and challenges that come with this development?

3. Drawing on the text, elaborate on the renewed importance of thalassocracy in the globalized world. How might the Mediterranean region leverage its strategic position and rich maritime history to capitalize on this trend?

4. Consider the impacts of the rising port traffic and increasing migration from North Africa and the Middle East on the Mediterranean region. How might these pressures shape the future role of the Mediterranean within the "Europe of the regions" context?

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THE EVOLUTION OF THE "EURO-MEDITERRANEAN BOUNDARY" BETWEEN THE PROMOTION OF VALUES AND INCONSISTENT EU POLICY-MAKING

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The goal of this contribution is to discuss how the European Union (EU) has conceived the political, social and cultural dimensions of its southern (i.e. Mediterranean) boundary over the years through the broader perspective provided by the so called "stabilization-democratization" dilemma. This dilemma has been conceptualized by policy analysts to describe the difficult balance among the main objectives of EU relations with Mediterranean states which, especially following the end of the Cold War, have provided a growing set of hard and soft security challenges to Europe and to its political and economic integration project (Biad 1997; Calabrese 1997).

The concept was particularly employed as a criticism of the inconsistent display of the normative character (Manners 2002; Tocci 2008) with which the EU invested its external action in the Mediterranean region, and was empirically demonstrated by the visible and long-standing gap between declaratory policy and insufficient or contradictory implementation on matters that could facilitate democratic transition and growing dialogue between the two shores of the Mediterranean Sea (Khader 2013; Gomez Isa 2017).

More specifically, since the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in 1995, the bilateral and regional Mediterranean political agenda of the EU has ostensibly been loaded with cooperation initiatives and political dialogue based on the promotion of liberal values, such as human rights, good governance, the rule of law. In addition, European institutions have also tried to advance a building common identity-building project, at the state and societal levels, through the advancement of inter-cultural dialogue programs and enhanced civil society

engagement to improve mutual understanding and interactions between the EU and Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs) (Pace 2007).

Generally speaking, the latter attempt has received some formal support and rhetoric commitment by MPCs over the years, but was not deprived of incongruences, contradictions and opposition (Panebianco 2018; de Perini 2019). By contrast, the promotion of liberal values, and of human rights in particular, has increasingly met with the resistance of MPCs. After all, the participation of MPCs in Euro-Mediterranean policy initiatives was never a genuine commitment to European values given that these countries 'were all authoritarian and with no intent to change their domestic structures of power to accommodate what they perceived as interference in their internal affairs' (Zoubir 2018; see also Smith 2013). Faced, on one hand, with the difficult choice between ensuring political and economic cooperation with MPCs to face fast-emerging challenges for European stability, including the threats brought by Islamic terrorism and irregular migrations flows, and, on the other, continuing to impose its soft and normative power in the area, the underlying choice of the EU was to scale down (compromise) its normative ambitions, and even accept the derailment of its values to ensure the continuation of policy cooperation in other security and economic fields. This choice, which allegedly demonstrates the prevalence of stabilization over democratization in the above recalled dilemma is not just the subject of academic critique. This behavior was regretted and, thus, inherently confirmed, by key European officials, especially in the aftermath of the Arab Spring (Füle 2011; Van Rompuy and Ashton 2011; Barroso 2011).

The 'stabilization-democratization' dilemma is, in fact, a core foreign policy dilemma for liberal actors and presumed 'global good Samaritans' (Brysk 2009). Foreign policy-making has a number of expectations which eventually feed back into the protection of the "national" interest (Hill 2016). Promoting human rights abroad can well be part of the national interest for a few either well-intentioned or instrumental reasons (Forsythe 2018; de Perini 2022). The same can be said for other soft cultural tools such as inter-cultural dialogue and cultural diplomacy. However, from the perspective of foreign-policy makers, the achievement of these objectives (as any other security or economic objectives) can appropriately be the subject of trade-offs when other more urgent or 'existential' interests appropriately take priority (Donnelly and Whelan 2020).

In other words, part of the inconsistency exposed by the illustration of this dilemma for the EU Mediterranean policy mirrors the unavoidable weighing process between moral and material considerations which an international actor must accept to face when defining and protecting its fundamental interests. While moral perfectionism is said to be 'inappropriate in foreign policy making' (Donnelly 2000), balancing between security considerations and value promotion is an integral part of this continuous weighting exercise, which is particular complex for the EU. As the latter is caught in the dichotomy between supranational and intergovernmental institutions, multiple actors within the EU have different (at times opposed) perceptions of how much the promotion of human rights and democratic values, on one side, and the importance of cultural interactions on the other, are important in their conception of what makes up national/European interest (de Perini 2020).

The promotion of human rights, democratization, and intercultural dialogue, especially by an effort to genuinely engage societies from both shores, represent important means for stabilization in a long-term perspective. However, as Christopher Hill (2003) stresses, foreign policy is always at the cusp between opportunity and constraint, and the 'long-term' may be not always the polar star guiding the formulation of specific foreign policy choices which are often highly contingent. To be sure, what has been discussed so far is not a justification for EU long standing ineffectiveness and policy inconsistency when it comes to the promotion of values and norms in the Mediterranean. It is a way to further problematize EU's past and ongoing efforts. The real critical point of this debate is not whether the EU has made stability considerations prevail over the promotion of values: this is inherent, and even reasonable, in the "pragmatism" of the foreign policy-making process. The core of the criticism is on how EU foreign policy has accepted to distort and sacrifice these tools and objectives in this balancing process, without reducing the outspoken rhetoric and commitment on these issues. In other words, the core of the criticism regards the evident rhetoric-performance gap (Panebianco 2006; Tocci 2005) within the observation of the 'stabilization-democratization' dilemma as a balancing process, and it is grounded on EU's hypocrisies in dealing differently with two equally reasonable and important policy goals.

Therefore, this short contribution claims that the dichotomies embedded in the "democratization-stabilization" dilemma also represent an original viewpoint to look

at how the EU has conceived and constructed its southern (and south-eastern) boundaries: not physically, but politically, socially and culturally. Indeed, stability can arguably be achieved both by making boundaries more permeable and by sealing them. Promoting intercultural dialogue and civil society cooperation promises to favor a more inclusive construction of a shared identity and sense of purpose, stressing commonalities but also focusing on accommodating diversity and work with it on shared projects. If coherently advanced, intercultural dialogue results in blurring the socio-cultural boundaries between the people and communities living in the two shores of the Mediterranean basin in the long term. Advancing, or even making economic cooperation conditional on the promotion of values and norms such as human rights and democracy, affects the political conception of such boundary. As the original ambition of the European Neighborhood Policy made clear in the early 2000s, cooperating on these values to establish a 'ring of friends' also leads to creating a larger political community based on common purpose and mutual accountability. Promoting human rights is a political movement, a struggle of 'right against might'. While ensuring stability by seeking to include neighboring countries into the liberal zone (Dunne and Hanson 2016), therefore, one of the expected consequences of founding regional cooperation on these values is lowering the political boundary which distinguish the power relation between the rulers and the ruled in the two shores of the Mediterranean.

If the policy objectives stated on these matters, although inherently made secondary to a general and more relevant search for European security or stability, are followed consistently, it is possible to conclude that EU Mediterranean policy aims to make the political, economic, and cultural boundary between Europe and the diversity of MPCs more permeable. If, by contrast, these policy objectives are still stated but the respective policy initiatives distort or contradict their expected aims, the political, social and cultural dimension of the Euro-Mediterranean boundary between the two shores is tightened up further. For instance, when arrangements between the EU and single MPCs to curb irregular migrations or to counter the terrorist threat tacitly accept inhuman treatments, allow actions that shrink the public space for civil society and Human Rights Defenders or facilitate the instrumentalization of culture and religion for political gains, the Mediterranean boundary becomes a barrier well beyond its physical functions, because the rhetoric-performance gap, shows the extent

of the unbalance of the stabilization-democratization dilemma and crashes any remaining trust at the societal level for the European project.

Ultimately, it is worth stressing that adopting this approach to analyze Euro-Mediterranean relations also allows us to address two elements of EU foreign policy-making under the same analytical framework that many would see as opposing, given the alleged incompatibility between universal human rights and cultural particularism (Mutua 2001). The 'minimum political consensus' on human rights which was eventually reached by the EU in its cooperation with MPCs was justified by these governments' claims of sovereignty and of cultural relativism (Biad 2003). From a relativist perspective, norms are only appropriate for the cultures out of which they emerge: thus, one can either promote (Western) human rights or accommodate cultural diversity and competing values. Some analysts have stressed that 'relativity operates within the boundaries set by the universality of the body of interdependent and indivisible internationally recognized human rights' (Donnelly and Whelan 2020). Also looking at this dichotomy from the proposed 'boundary perspective' reduces this dichotomy. Cultural diversity and human rights are not in competition but allows addressing different dimensions of the same boundary which are often interlinked. For instance, protecting religious diversity is both a matter of human rights and a key element of any intercultural dialogue consideration in the Mediterranean space.

Questions for students:

1. How does the "stabilization-democratization dilemma" look like in the context of EU-Mediterranean policy?
2. How can the "rhetoric-performance gap" and the "stabilization-democratization dilemma" intersect in affecting the promotion of EU values in the Mediterranean?
3. To what extent are trade-offs between the promotion of values and the protection of political and economic interests unacceptable from a foreign policy-making perspective?
4. Are the promotion of human rights and that of intercultural dialogue inherently contradictory?

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Useful Links:

- EEAS - European Neighborhood Policy
  https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/european-neighbourhood-policy_en#:~:text=The%20European%20Neighbourhood%20Policy%20(ENP,their%20mutual%20benefit%20and%20interest.

- EEAS – EU Human Rights and Democracy Policy
  https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/human-rights-democracy_en

- European Commission, DG Near: European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations
  https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/european-neighbourhood-policy/southern-neighbourhood_en

- Union for the Mediterranean
  https://ufmsecretariat.org/

- Josep Borrell: A new start for the Mediterranean (2021, blog post)
  https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/new-start-mediterranean_en

- Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor (NGO)
  https://www.euromedmonitor.org/en

- Euro-Med Rights (Civil Society Network)
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CULTURAL DIVERSITY AS A BENCH TEST FOR THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

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In view of the growing amount of immigration into European countries in recent decades, we are witnessing a phenomenon that has been defined as a *fait accompli* in international family relations,[28] in the sense that European legislators and judges are increasingly called on to determine the validity of legal situations 'packaged elsewhere' which are often unprecedented or even prohibited in Europe.

In principle, each State is free to determine whether a foreign judgment deserves recognition and in which circumstances foreign law rather than the law of the forum ought to apply. In other words, it is for each State to decide whether in a given set of circumstances the rights asserted in a foreign judgment or resulting from a foreign law should be enforceable locally. In fact, the majority of States apply the national law of the person concerned to personal and family matters, for instance legal capacity and the capacity to marry. The use of nationality as a connecting factor has more than one technical advantage. First of all, the operation of rules based on nationality is naturally rigid since nationality is a status objectively conferred by the rules in a State. Judicial authorities enjoy little or no discretion in ascertaining and regulating it. International harmony and stability are further advantages. Indeed, the use of nationality as a connecting factor has the merit of ensuring the 'cross-border continuity' of a person's rights and status, which follow the person as his shadow does. If the law of the forum were to apply, the same personal situations would be governed by different laws in different ways depending on the place where the person is. A person might

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[28] Y. Lequette, *De la "proximité" au "fait accompli,"* in Mélanges en l'honneur du Professeur Pierre Mayer, Paris, 2015, pp. 481-518.

be capable of contracting marriage or making a will in his place of origin and at the same time might be unable to validly perform the same acts in another place – even nearby – just because a different less favorable law applies there. Moreover, the fact that nationality is subject to few or no changes during the lifespan of most individuals implies stability in the applicable law. Finally, nationality takes into account the cultural links of a person with their State of origin better than other factors and this valorizes their personal and cultural identity.[29] In fact, shaping connecting factors according to the nationality principle means favoring a multicultural and more open society. The ECtHR itself has recognized that "especially in conflict of laws cases the differentiation for all family issues according to nationality […] is a well-known principle which aims at protecting a person's close connection with his or her home country," [30] and all the more so when the legal system of origin is multi-legislative on a personal basis for historical or religious reasons or for the protection of minorities. The ECtHR links pluralism with recognition of, and respect for, diversity, and sees the latter as an essential means to achieve social cohesion.[31]

In the past, the choice of nationality as a criterion for connection found justification in the aim to keep European emigrants tied to their State of origin.[32] However, with Europe rapidly becoming a continent of immigration, the use of this connecting factor entails a multiplication of situations in which European judges must apply foreign rules which are inspired by concepts either of the family or of the relationship between men and women which are very different to those on which European legislations are based.[33] Indeed, many people settling in European States come from countries where religious laws – above all Islamic law – are applied and where religious authorities are entrusted with exclusively administering some important aspects of social life, mainly family ones, so much so that in some States a multi-confessional legal system remains, which is therefore multi-legislative on a personal basis.

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[29] In this sense see also E. Jayme, *Identité culturelle et intégration: le droit international privé postmoderne*, Recueil des cours, 1995, tome 251, p. 253.

[30] ECtHR, Application no. 51625/08 *Ammdjadi v. Germany*, decision as to the admissibility, 9 March 2010, p. 8.

[31] ECtHR, Application no. 44158/98, *Gorzelik and others v. Poland*, 17 February 2004, para. 92.

[32] On political strategies underpinning the use of nationality as a connecting factor, see P. Franzina, *The Evolving Role of Nationality in Private International Law*, in A. Annoni and S. Forlati (eds.), The Changing Role of Nationality in International Law, New York, 2013, pp. 195-197.

[33] In *Schalk and Kopf v. Austria* the ECtHR observed that marriage has deep-rooted social and cultural connotations which may greatly differ from one society to another. See, ECtHR, *Schalk and Kopf v. Austria*, no. 30141/04, 24 June 2010, para. 62; *M. and Others v. Italy and Bulgaria*, Application no. 40020/03, 31 July 2012, para. 161.

This raises a number of sensitive issues as some rules in religious law are inherently discriminatory and unavoidably cause conflicts with European legal systems. This is particularly true of Islamic law. The reverse is also true, in the sense that compatibility problems also arise when European institutions 'ask' to be recognized in legal systems on the other side of the Mediterranean Sea. Adoption, recognition of natural filiation by the father and marriage of a Muslim woman with a non-Muslim man clash with the principles of Sharia and have no effect in Islamic States.

Public policy (*ordre public*) is the traditional means available in all States to protect the values of the forum as they result from the national constitution 'in osmosis' with human rights treaties that the State of the forum is a party to. Through this exception, referral to foreign law can be made inoperative and recognition of foreign judgments and acts can be excluded. The centrality of this notion is therefore apparent. It works like a compass and defines the degree of openness or closure of each legal system to foreign laws, judgements and acts and thus represents the degree of tolerance of diversity which is implicit in any system of private international law. Systematic or over-frequent setting aside of foreign laws by means of the public policy exception leads to frustration of private international law, to the extent that it implies dismantling its techniques and aims and gives rise to a multiplication of those limping situations that the ECtHR itself is inclined to condemn in the name of the right to transnational continuity of personal and family status, which is protected by Article 8 ECHR. If the limit of public policy were systematically triggered, a conflict of laws would stiffen and turn into a clash of civilizations.

The terms of the problem have already been defined. On the one hand, nationality as a connecting factor takes into account the cultural links a person has with their State of origin better than other factors. On the other hand, recognizing the validity of certain foreign legal acts or applying foreign laws can give rise to problems of compatibility with the fundamental values of a western forum and very often with human rights as codified in the ECHR, such as the principle of equality between spouses.

As said, if European judges are called on to apply legal norms which are discriminatory on a religious or gender basis, they have the public policy escape at their disposal. However, reference to public policy cannot be considered to give *carte blanche* for any measure.[34]

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[34] ECtHR, *Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy*, Application no. 25358/12, 27 January 2015, para. 80.

From the perspective of the ECHR, activation of the public policy clause is a measure interfering in individuals' rights. Therefore, each Member State is required to carefully assess the concrete impact of activation of the public policy escape on individuals on the one hand and on society on the other, and to verify whether a refusal to enforce a foreign measure or to apply a foreign law is necessary and proportionate to satisfaction of the imperative needs of the State of the forum:[35] "l'interprétation par le juge [...] de la notion d'ordre public ne doit pas être faite de manière arbitraire et disproportionnée."[36]

Let us take some examples. In several Islamic countries it is possible for a man to enter into marriage with more than one woman. In contrast, a woman is never allowed to enter into marriage with more than one man. This clashes with the principles of equality between men and women, and more specifically between spouses, which are respectively enshrined in Article 14 ECHR and in Article 5 of additional Protocol no. 7 to the ECHR, and with the principle of monogamy of marriage, which for instance in Italy is imposed by a rule of necessary application (Article 86 of the civil code, which requires the free status of spouses as a condition to get married).[37] Recognition of a polygamous marriage would therefore expose European States to responsibility for violation of the ECHR. There are, however, some limits to respect for a refusal to be proportional. First of all, the focus must be on the concrete situation, with the consequence that polygamous marriages are not recognizable for public policy reasons but only when they are effectively polygamous, not if they are monogamous but celebrated according to a law allowing polygamy.

Moreover, since the rationale of the public policy exception is to prevent foreign laws or judgments from producing effects in the State of the forum which are contrary to its fundamental principles, effects which are not contrary to such fundamental principles should remain safe. In particular, elimination of all the effects of a polygamous marriage could be detrimental for the weak party in the relationship, the woman. It would be unfair and disproportionate to reject the claim of a second spouse in a polygamous marriage concluded abroad seeking maintenance from her former husband after repudiation. Similarly,

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[35] ECtHR, *Wagner and J.M.W.L. v. Luxembourg*, Application no. 76240/01, 28 June 2007, paras. 123-124; ECtHR, *Negrepontis-Giannisis v. Greece*, Application no. 56759/08, 3 May 2011, paras. 60-61.

[36] ECtHR, *Negrepontis-Giannisis v. Greece*, cit., para. 90.

[37] Article 116 of the Italian civil code makes it clear that Article 86 is a rule of necessary application since it states that "even a foreigner is [...] subject to the provisions contained in Articles [...] 86" [anche lo straniero è [...] soggetto alle disposizioni contenute negli articoli [...] 86].

denial of the legitimacy of children born from a second marriage would be disproportionate in the light of the internationally sanctioned principle of the best interests of the child. As a result, there have been doctrinal and jurisprudential efforts to draw up techniques aimed at mitigating the impact of public policy, for instance the theory of the *effet atténué de l'ordre public*.

By means of the theory of the *effet atténué de l'ordre public*, domestic tribunals block unwanted legal situations but not the legal effects which stem from them. The objective of this theory and its main merit are crystal clear: to achieve a compromise able to decrease the number of conflicts between legal systems and to avoid unreasonable and ultimately unfair results which might derive from automatic and trenchant refusals to recognize foreign situations clashing with fundamental values of the forum State. For instance, through the application of this notion, some if not all the legal effects deriving from a polygamous marriage can be kept if this is necessary to protect the vulnerable party. From this perspective, a polygamous marriage is merely considered a *datum*, a historic fact which produces legal effects without being recognized as a valid marriage.

A similar reasoning can be developed for repudiation (*talaq*). The right to repudiate is an unlimited right that the husband is exclusively entitled to. The woman has no right to repudiate and can at the most reserve for herself the right to autonomously trigger the dissolution of marriage through provision in the contract of marriage of a sort of right to self-repudiate. In the absence of this contractual provision, the woman can resort to divorce to an extent which is, however, different from State to State.[38] One could argue that equality between men and women is restored if divorce is easily accessible for women, with the consequence that a single answer in terms of the compatibility of repudiation with public policy is not possible. Regardless of this, a repudiation might be issued with the genuine consent of the wife. The woman might even ask for recognition of her repudiation in the State of the forum, possibly in order to re-marry. In these cases, dissolution of marriage takes on a consensual nature and the principle of equality is in practice unprejudiced.[39] In sum, defense of the principle of equality requires taking into account the concrete positions of both spouses. A similar case-by-case approach is necessary

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[38] R. Aluffi Beck-Peccoz, *La modernizzazione del diritto di famiglia nei paesi arabi*, Milano, 1990, pp. 121-135.

[39] C. Campiglio, *Identità culturale, diritti umani e diritto internazionale privato*, Rivista di diritto internazionale, 2011, pp. 1061-1062.

concerning guarantees. While repudiation is a private act in some Islamic states, in others the repudiation procedure involves intervention by a judge or a notary. Therefore, a negative reaction by means of activation of public policy would only be proportionate if repudiation were issued without guarantees of defense for the woman.[40] In conclusion, the absence of equality between the spouses and the absence of essential rights of defense for the woman are legitimate grounds for refusing recognition of repudiation according to an assessment of the concrete circumstances of the case. However, if these fundamental principles are in practice respected, a repudiation should be considered equivalent to a divorce on a unilateral request or to a consensual divorce in the State of the forum.[41]

A different reasoning is possible. It has been argued that repudiation is in no way comparable to divorce because the latter is based on an objective situation – failure of the marriage – which is evidenced by a prolonged separation of the spouses or is ascertained by a judge while the former consists of the discretional faculty of a man to free himself from marriage and creates a situation of submission for the woman which jeopardizes her dignity because she is subject to a perennial threat of being repudiated if she does not comply with the authority of her husband. It is therefore a prerogative that has no equivalence for the bride, not even when she is recognized to have a right to unilaterally apply for a divorce.[42] However, even if one follows this path of reasoning and concludes that repudiation cannot be adapted to divorce, this does not exclude effects resulting from it which have already been produced in the legal system of origin being recognized. From this perspective, and according to the theory of the *effet atténué de l'ordre public*, repudiation will have legal relevance not as an act but as a fact producing legal effects in the State of the forum.

Further theories, namely *ordre public de proximité*, and *Inlandsbeziehung*, have been drawn up with the aim of mitigating the impact of public policy. They make this impact proportional to the intensity of the connection between the case and the State of the forum. While permitting recognition of situations created abroad with no connection with the forum, they block and do not recognize the same situation if it has some connection with the State

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[40] On this issue, see O. Lopez Pegna, *L'incidenza dell'art. 6 della Convenzione Europea dei diritti dell'uomo rispetto all'esecuzione di decisioni straniere*, Rivista di diritto internazionale, 2011, pp. 33-43.

[41] In this sense, see also O. Vanin, *Ripudio islamico, principio del contradditorio e ordine pubblico italiano*, La nuova giurisprudenza civile commentata, 2015, p. 1036.

[42] G. Carella, *Diritti umani, conflitti di legge e conflitti di civilizzazione*, Bari, 2011, pp. 52-53. However, Carella then mitigates this position and argues that if the wife applies for recognition of the repudiation she renounces the right to claim infringement of the principle of non-discrimination. *Ibidem*, pp. 71-72.

(in practice, the domicile of either of the parties or citizenship). However, the thesis that the intensity of public policy depends on the degree of connection of the case with the State of the forum is difficult to accept. According to Article 1 ECHR, the fundamental rights provided in the ECHR must be recognized for each individual within the jurisdiction of the Member States, with the consequence that a distinction between citizens and foreigners cannot have any relevance. [43] It is inadmissible to say, for example, that repudiation can be recognized if it is carried out against a foreign woman and should not be if it is carried out against a national. To admit this different treatment would only add discrimination based on nationality to discrimination based on sex. It is submitted that the impact of public policy should instead be different depending on whether the object of the assessment is recognition of effects which an act has already validly produced abroad or constitution *ex novo* of a personal and family status in the legal system of the forum. In the second case there is no continuity of status to be protected.

Conclusions

Since the origin of private international law there has been a possibility inherent in the system for judges to assess the effects that would derive from application to specific cases of laws referred to or decisions issued abroad and to reject them insofar as application or execution of them would produce effects incompatible with fundamental principles of the forum. This 'reaction of rejection' occurs more frequently when nationality is used as the connecting criterion because with this criterion foreign laws governing sensitive matters, such as the status of persons and family relationships, are brought into the legal system.

Nevertheless, integration of human rights in private international law reasoning nowadays offers the possibility of giving a new interpretation to this exception. While legal pluralism and public policy were traditionally considered to be antithetical principles, public policy read through the lens of human rights takes on a 'pluralistic' connotation because many

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[43] See A. Malatesta, *Cultural Diversity and Private International Law*, in G. Venturini and S. Bariatti (eds.), Nuovi strumenti del diritto internazionale privato, Liber Fausto Pocar, Milan, 2009, pp. 649-650. See also F. Mosconi and C. Campiglio, *Diritto internazionale privato e processuale. Parte generale e contratti*, vol. I, 2007, p. 239 against the idea of varying public policy.

opposite 'pushes' must be balanced. Protecting European values cannot lead to sacrificing the rights and interests of the individuals concerned beyond what is strictly necessary. From this perspective the efforts of both doctrine and jurisprudence to reduce the effects of public policy and to relativize its impact by means of the attenuated public order theory can be appreciated. With these techniques, foreign laws and institutions clashing with European values cannot enter Europe, but refusals to recognize their effects are admitted only in so far as they are proportionate to the intended purpose.

Questions for students:

1. What is public policy?
2. What is the so called *effet atténué de l'ordre public*?
3. What is the *Inlandsbeziehung* theory and why should it be rejected?

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- ECtHR, M. and Others v. Italy and Bulgaria, Application no. 40020/03, 31 July 2012, para. 161.

- ECtHR, Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy, Application no. 25358/12, 27 January 2015, para. 80.

- ECtHR, Çapın v. Turkey, application no. 44690/09, 15 October 2019, paras. 33-34;

- ECtHR, Boljević v. Serbia, application no. 47443/14, 16 June 2020, para. 28.

Useful links:

- European Court of Human Rights, Document Collections:
  https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22documentcollectionid2%22:[%22GRANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22]}

THE INTERCONTINENTAL BIOSPHERE RESERVE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN ANDALUSIA (SPAIN)-MOROCCO

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Introduction to Biosphere Reserves

UNESCO's Biosphere Reserves, established in 1971, aim to promote and demonstrate a balanced relationship between people and nature. Their primary purpose is environmental conservation and sustainable development. While Biosphere Reserves do not have legal protections, the responsibility for protecting these areas falls on national, regional, and local administrations.

This contribution will focus on the Intercontinental Biosphere Reserve of the Mediterranean (IBRM), which spans Spain and Morocco, specifically encompassing the regions of Andalusia and the Rif area in northern Morocco. A comprehensive understanding of the similarities and differences in the implementation of this Intercontinental Biosphere Reserve classification in both regions will be provided. The primary factors justifying the declaration of the Biosphere Reserve will be elucidated, along with an analysis of the spatial distribution of these factors,

the varying levels of protection afforded to each, their advantages, and their principal challenges.

The Intercontinental Biosphere Reserve of the Mediterranean

The IBRM is unique as it includes the sea within its boundaries, encompassing an area of exceptional ecological importance, which serves as a critical corridor for the migration of numerous species. It has a total perimeter of 1,200 kilometers, including a marine region of nearly 200 square kilometers. Geological features, such as the Penibaetic and Rif Mountain ranges, contribute to the unique and diverse ecosystems of the reserve.

Approved in 2006, the IBRM is the world's second-largest biosphere reserve and represents a unique innovation in spatial management of protected areas due to its transcontinental nature. This reserve is the first of its kind, incorporating land from two different continents and encompassing diverse ecological, social, and economic zones. Its establishment represents a significant step towards developing a collaborative approach to conservation between countries and promoting transboundary cooperation in environmental protection.

As ecosystem boundaries do not necessarily align with political boundaries, it is necessary to have a protective figure that encompasses the entire territory of protected ecosystems. Thus, in this area the promotion of a balanced relationship between people and nature in the transcontinental area is pursued, despite the considerable complexity this implies in administration and management.

It is also worth mentioning that the connection of ecosystems on both sides, separated by the sea, can be explained by their shared geological origin. While the formation of the Strait of Gibraltar has disconnected terrestrial species, aerial and maritime species remain connected between the two continents. Consequently, the preservation of these natural corridors is essential for promoting biodiversity and sustainable management of natural resources in the IBRM.

Spatial Organization of the IBRM

Internal Composition of Biosphere Reserves

Concerning the internal composition of the reserve, the IBRM is divided into three distinct zones with varying levels of protection and permitted activities: the core area, the buffer zone, and the transition area. The core area, which is the smallest and most strictly protected, is vital for preserving delicate and valuable landscapes, ecosystems, and species. The buffer zone allows activities compatible with sound ecological practices, while the transition area is where communities engage in sustainable social, cultural, and economic activities without disturbing the more protected zones. This zoning system ensures that areas of high ecological value receive strict protection while allowing sustainable activities in other areas.

Political Complexity Due to the Presence of Three Countries in the Region

The Strait of Gibraltar is a critical component of the IBRM, holding both physical and geopolitical importance as it connects Europe and Africa. The strong currents and geopolitical complexity of the Strait, arising from its location between Spain, Morocco, and Gibraltar (United Kingdom), necessitate careful management to preserve its unique ecosystem. The region's international transport channel further complicates its geopolitical landscape.

Evolution of the Protected Area on Both Shores

The Moroccan side of the IBRM has experienced a slower protection process compared to the Spanish side, although the National Park of Talassemtane and the Biological Site of Ecological Interest of Jbel Mussa are notable protected areas. The reserve's proximity to major cities such as Algeciras, Tetuan, and Tangier presents challenges in balancing economic growth with environmental protection. Future discussions will focus on addressing the competing interests of national states in promoting economic activity and development while preserving natural ecosystems, as well as the compromises necessary to adhere to the Biosphere Reserve Intercontinental declaration. Ultimately, it is essential to find ways

to balance economic growth with environmental protection to ensure a sustainable future for the area.

The Compatibility between Economic Growth and Ecological Preservation in Morocco: The Case Study of TangerMed

In this section, it will be discussed the conflict arising from the competing goals of the Moroccan government and the special planning of the Biosphere Reserve scheme in the Strait of Gibraltar. While the government aims to promote economic activity and development, the Biosphere Reserve declaration strives to preserve natural ecosystems and maintain a sustainable ecological balance.

Reorganization of Morocco's Industrial Geography Towards the Strait of Gibraltar and the Role of TangerMed

The Moroccan government has built a large-scale port in the Strait of Gibraltar called TangerMed in order to capitalize on the region's high traffic volume and economic benefits. The selected location boasts strategic advantages due to its physical characteristics and connectivity to other areas. However, concerns have arisen regarding the potential impact of the port on the local ecosystems within the Biosphere Reserve of special interest, situated less than a kilometer from the port's boundaries.

The main value of TangerMed is that it can serve as a gateway to global trade and commerce and facilitate the movement of goods and raw materials across regions and nations. Its capacities, connectivity, and logistics free zone provide a full range of high added-value logistics services, making it an attractive industrial competitiveness platform, attracting investments and multinational corporations. In this regard, the creation of free tariff zones, or "zone franche," around the port is one of the factors that has stimulated investment and created a favorable business environment, encouraging foreign and domestic investment and fostering the development of new industries.

The area's challenging terrain and restricted access to Europe, owing to strong currents, have contributed to its underdevelopment for centuries. However, the construction of infrastructure, such as highways and railways, as well as the rapid completion of the TangerMed project, has significantly shifted the industrial geography of the country, posing challenges to the integrity of the IBRM.

Creation of a New Pole of Development in the Northern Region of Morocco

The TangerMed port project is a significant infrastructural development aimed at stimulating economic growth in the entire northern region of Morocco, not just the local area of the facilities. The government's plan involves the establishment of new industrial areas with special incentives near major cities and the creation of new administrative units, for example, Fahs Anjra. This new industrial area surrounds the Biosphere Reserve, having indirect impacts on the protected areas.

The International Connectivity of the Port

One of the main goals of the TangerMed project is to enhance connectivity between Morocco and Europe by creating physical connections (Fixed Link, possibly through a tunnel) by railway and road infrastructure to capitalize on Morocco's lower costs compared to Europe. There are two possible routes to accomplish this goal: "ruta del umbral" and "ruta de cañón." Despite the higher cost and engineering challenges of the latter, it is more likely to be chosen due to its proximity to the TangerMed port. This infrastructure will be very close to the Biosphere Reserve, particularly in the aquatic area, and it will inevitably have some impact on the IBRM.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Biosphere Reserve area near Jbel Mussa will be significantly impacted by the development of TangerMed, transforming natural areas into large-scale projects aimed at supplying Europe. This tension between development and conservation is not unique

to Morocco, but it emphasizes the necessity for a balanced approach that addresses both economic and environmental concerns. Adhering to laws and regulations protecting ecosystems while considering the long-term consequences of such projects on the natural world is of paramount importance. In this regard, the existence of a buffer area around certain delicate ecosystems should be taken into consideration, in which transgressive activities, such as industrial areas, should be excluded.

Questions for students

1. What challenges does the Intercontinental Biosphere Reserve of the Mediterranean (IBRM) face due to its transcontinental nature and the presence of three countries (Spain, Morocco, and the United Kingdom) in the region?

2. How does the zoning system within the IBRM (core area, buffer zone, and transition area) help balance environmental protection and sustainable development?

3. What are the potential environmental impacts of the TangerMed port project on the IBRM, and how can the tensions between economic development and environmental conservation be addressed?

4. Considering the case of TangerMed, what strategies can be employed to ensure that large-scale projects and economic growth do not compromise the integrity of delicate ecosystems, such as those found in the IBRM?

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- Intercontinental Biosphere Reserve of the Mediterranean (IBRM) - UNESCO MAB Biosphere Reserves Directory:
  https://en.unesco.org/mabdb/br/brdir/directory/biores.asp?mode=all&code=SPA+25
- Tanger Med Port Authority: https://www.tmpa.ma/en/
- The World Bank - Morocco Overview:
  https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/morocco/overview
- The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD): https://www.cbd.int/
- European Environment Agency - Protected Areas in Europe:
  https://www.eea.europa.eu/themes/biodiversity/protected-areas

Audio-video materials available online

1. UNESCO Biosphere Reserves - Overview (Video)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gkzar079rKI

2. Biosphere Reserves: Laboratories for Sustainable Development (Video)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L9T_JhwwArA

3. UNESCO Man and Biosphere Programme (MAB programme) in Spain, 2015

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=md4SP3FiqsQ

4. Introduction to Tanger Med (Video)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zmEvwKylyOk&t=18s

The Evolution of Factors Explaining the Spatial Distribution of Tourism in the Mediterranean Area

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Introduction

Spanning parts of Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, the Mediterranean region has consistently captivated visitors from around the world since the 1960s. Its unwavering appeal as a tourist destination has withstood various crises, including the recent COVID-19 pandemic, showcasing the region's remarkable resilience.

Therefore, this text aims to delve into the underlying factors contributing to the Mediterranean region's enduring allure, with an emphasis on the role of geography and its impact on tourism. By exploring intriguing research questions such as how geographical elements have shaped the region's appeal and what differentiates the Mediterranean from other tourist destinations, this textbook seeks to provide a comprehensive understanding of the Mediterranean's sustained prominence in the world of tourism.

Statistical data from the United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) provides a snapshot of the Mediterranean's success in comparison to other regions. In 2021, despite the pandemic, the Mediterranean region received 142 million visits, accounting for 33% of the total global tourism expenditure. This remarkable performance highlights the region's standing as one of the most prominent tourist areas in Europe and worldwide.

However, it is essential to recognize that the Mediterranean region is not a monolithic entity. Its rich history, cultural diversity, and natural landscapes contribute to significant variations within the area. To better understand the region's tourist dynamics, it can be divided into three primary subregions: the eastern, northern, and southern Mediterranean. Each subregion has experienced distinct trends in tourism growth, with the northern and eastern Mediterranean seeing steady increases, while the southern Mediterranean has experienced more modest growth.

Despite these differences, one commonality among Mediterranean countries is the significant contribution of European tourists to their tourism industries. Approximately 86% of outbound trips from European countries are directed toward other European destinations, with European customers constituting about 40% of the customer base in Mediterranean countries.

Spatial Location and Tourism

Tourism is a multifaceted industry that encompasses a variety of disciplines. Geography plays a crucial role in analyzing the tourism industry, as it focuses on the territory or space as a significant factor of attraction. The territory produces, accumulates, and values natural, cultural, artistic, and other resources, which in turn become tourist attractions.

Territorial Capital

Territorial Capital, as defined by Camagni (2008), is the system of territorial assets of an economic, cultural, social, and environmental nature that ensures the development potential of places. Its main characteristics include its stationary nature, its singularity, and the effort required to produce touristic resources from territorial capital.

The success of the Mediterranean area as the main destination for international tourism can be explained by four keywords related to several elements present in the tourist destination. These are:

a. Climate: The Mediterranean climate is mild, with no extreme climatic phenomena, which favors outdoor tourism activities.

b. Landscape variety: The Mediterranean basin features a multitude of monumental cities with diverse and long histories, as well as a variety of environmental landscapes.

c. Accessibility: The Mediterranean area boasts an extensive airport network, short distances to main visitor countries, and the free movement of goods, people, and services provided by the Schengen agreement.

d. Safety: Political, monetary, and citizen security are crucial factors influencing the distribution of tourist activity in the region.

Spatial Patterns of Tourism

The distribution of spatial patterns of tourism depends on various factors, including location of demand, consumption capacity, obstacles and restrictions, existence of top-rated geographical places, and technological capacity. The proximity of a location to Europe, specifically the Mediterranean, and improvements in transportation make it an attractive destination. The existence of a broad tourist offer, both basic and complementary, is important for consumption capacity. Obstacles and restrictions such as visa requirements can impact the likelihood of visitors choosing a destination. The influence of tourist operators and trends can also impact destination choice. Finally, technological capacity is becoming increasingly important, with the digitization of companies, users, and destinations essential for reaching and influencing tourists before, during, and after their trips.

Key Factors of Tourism Development

Tourism development has evolved over time, influenced by changes in four dimensions, namely: time, space, income, and tourist behavior. Such dimensions influence tourism arrivals in the following ways:

1. Time: Vacation periods have become more fragmented now than before, with people taking breaks during various times of the year.
2. Space: Advances in transport technology have made destinations more accessible and reduced travel times compared to the 1960s.
3. Income: The improvement in welfare and economic growth in visitor countries, compared to decades ago, has led to increased tourism expenditure.
4. Touristic behavior: All the former factors have led to visitors seeking unique experiences, which in turn has led to a rise in visits to international destinations.

The Concept of Distance in Tourism

Distance in tourism is increasingly measured in terms of time and cost, influenced by technological advancements in transport and information technology. The distance factor is important because the geographical position of a destination can be advantageous or disadvantageous, depending on its proximity to visitor countries and the attractiveness of its touristic offerings.

Geographical distance alone does not determine the frequency of connections between cities. Other factors such as cultural, linguistic, and political distances also play a significant role. For instance, Seville's European cultural and linguistic proximity to Paris and London leads to more frequent connections, despite their greater geographical distance compared to Tangier, Morocco. Political differences also influence the frequency of connections between cities.

Spatial Location and Tourism: Factors

In this section, the importance of geography in shaping Mediterranean tourism will be analyzed, focusing on aspects such as climate, natural and cultural resources, and the role of the European Union and dynamic factors.

The Role of Climate in Mediterranean Tourism

The Mediterranean climate, characterized by mild temperatures, abundant sunshine, and relatively low humidity, plays a crucial role in attracting tourists to the region. This climate not only enables a wide range of outdoor activities but also creates optimal conditions for enjoying the Mediterranean's stunning coastal landscapes. However, climate can also present challenges to the tourism industry, such as the negative impact of strong winds or extreme heat on visitor satisfaction and destination appeal. Nevertheless, even out of displeasing climate conditions, it is possible to create a touristic niche like windsurfing tourism in the locality of Tarifa, Spain.

Natural and Cultural Resources in the Mediterranean Region

The Mediterranean boasts a rich array of natural and cultural resources, including diverse landscapes, a lengthy coastline, and a vibrant mix of historical and contemporary cultural offerings. It is worth mentioning the coexistence of the architecture's footprint from different ages, ancient festivals, and traditions accumulated throughout centuries. All these resources contribute to the region's appeal as a tourist destination in great numbers but also require careful management and promotion to maintain their value and attractiveness.

Nonetheless, diverse natural and cultural landscapes can become touristic resources if they hold social value. It is imperative that these landscapes are transformed into social products. However, the social value of touristic products can change over time, necessitating the constant regeneration of new and unique landscapes to maintain demand. In fact, only a handful of resources remain as primary pull factors for demand.

For example, the "Tomatina Festival", located in a small Spanish town of 10,000 people, grew from a few hundred visitors in the 1980s to thousands of attendees today, thanks to the socialization of this product. Another example could be the "Caminito del Rey" path, which started as the world's most dangerous path and, with proper valuation and socialization, became a spectacular tourist route.

Tourism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Countries

Despite the challenges posed by security concerns and political instability, tourism in the MENA countries is growing due to factors such as proximity to European markets, increasing interest from Asian visitors, and the region's rich cultural heritage. Strategies for further developing tourism in this subregion include promoting low-cost travel options and leveraging the natural and cultural resources unique to the area.

The Role of the European Union in Mediterranean Tourism

Although the European Union (EU) does not directly have jurisdiction to the tourism industry, it plays a significant role in shaping the sector through actions such as promoting cooperation among member states, encouraging a favorable business environment, and supporting initiatives aimed at enhancing the sustainability and competitiveness of tourism in the region.

Dynamic Factors Influencing Mediterranean Tourism

After considering the impact of geography on tourist activity, let us now focus on some dynamic factors that may significantly change demand in the short and long term. Such factors include:

a. The technological factors implemented in the process of accommodating tourists at the destination.

b. The qualification of personnel, which may increase customer satisfaction or expand the range of segments present in the region.

c. The existence of public and private investment, which may dramatically alter the destination by enlarging the breadth of the offer or upgrading the existing offer.

d. The mention of a destination in specialized information channels, as well as its inclusion in operators' channels, may significantly increase demand.

Conclusion: Key Ideas and Future Outlook

The Mediterranean region continues to be a leading global tourist destination, benefiting from its unique geographical and cultural features. However, challenges such as political instability and security concerns in the MENA countries, the need for continuous regeneration of tourism products, and the growing competitiveness of other global destinations require ongoing attention and strategic planning. The United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) predicts that the Mediterranean will remain the primary recipient of international tourism through 2030, but monitoring the behavior of emerging tourism markets in Asia is essential to anticipating and adapting to future challenges and opportunities.

Questions for students

1. What are the key geographical factors that have contributed to the Mediterranean region's success as a leading global tourist destination? Provide examples for each factor.
2. How does the concept of Territorial Capital play a role in the creation of a touristic destination, and what are some examples of Territorial Capital in the Mediterranean region?
3. Discuss the importance of climate in Mediterranean tourism and provide an example of how a specific climate condition has created a touristic niche in the region.
4. Identify and explain the dynamic factors that may significantly change the demand for tourism in the Mediterranean region in the short and long term.

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Useful links:

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- Mediterranean Tourism Foundation (MTF): https://www.medtourismfoundation.com/

- The European Union's role in tourism development:
  https://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/tourism_en

- The Mediterranean Sea: https://www.worldatlas.com/seas/mediterranean-sea.html

- Tourism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries:

https://www.wttc.org/economic-impact/country-analysis/middle-east-and-north-africa-mena/

- Examples of popular Mediterranean destinations and attractions:

La Tomatina Festival: https://www.latomatinatours.com/

Caminito del Rey: https://www.caminitodelrey.info/en/

Audio-video materials available online

- Lonely planet. Introducing Mediterranean Europe (video):

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JpLMWm7H9mM

- The Economist. The changing face of tourism (video):

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O3bx5miizBw

- Present and the future of tourism in the Mediterranean countries:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s29oqqgysLg

- European Parliament. Future of tourism: sustainable, responsible, smart:

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